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A B S T R A C T
We examine the role of low-power individuals in social power research. A multi-method literature review reveals
that low-power individuals may be insufficiently understood because many studies lack necessary control
conditions that allow drawing inferences about low power, effects are predominantly attributed to high power,
and qualitative reviews primarily focus on how high-power individuals feel, think, and behave. Challenging the
assumption that low power tends to produce opposite consequences of high power, we highlight several simi-
larities between the two states. Based on social exchange theories, we propose that unequal-power (vs. equal-
power) relationships make instrumental goals, competitive attitudes, and exchange rules salient, which can
cause both high- and low-power individuals to behave similarly. Two experiments suggest that although low-
power individuals sometimes behave in opposite ways to high-power individuals (i.e., they take less action), at
other times they behave similarly (i.e., they objectify others to the same extent). We discuss the systematic study
of low-power individuals and highlight methodological implications.
1. Introduction
Over the past decades, a considerable interest in understanding the
consequences of social power has developed. This research provides us
with a multitude of insights into how the powerful think, feel, and
behave. For example, studies report that, compared to having little
power, being powerful leads individuals to form superficial social per-
ceptions (Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Fiske, 1993), engage in approach-re-
lated behavior (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002), objectify themselves and
others (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Inesi, Lee, & Rios,
2014), overestimate their own height and underestimate others’ height
(Duguid & Goncalo, 2012; Yap, Mason, & Ames, 2013), reap more
benefits at the bargaining table (Galinsky, Schaerer, & Magee, 2017),
and report greater well-being (Kifer, Heller, Perunovic, & Galinsky,
2013).
Power can be defined as individuals’ asymmetric control over va-
luable resources (Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 2010; Keltner, Gruenfeld, &
Anderson, 2003; Magee & Smith, 2013). Thus, being high in power
implies having control over relatively more resources, while being low
in power implies having relatively less control over valued resources. A
review of the published literature relying on this conceptualization
suggests that past theories and studies have mainly focused on ex-
plaining the consequences of having control over a lot of resources, i.e.,
the behavior of the powerful (for recent reviews, see Galinsky, Rucker, &
Magee, 2015; Schaerer, Lee, Galinsky, & Thau, 2018; Sturm &
Antonakis, 2015). The present research investigates whether this focus
on high power may have led to an insufficient understanding of the
consequences of low power. Specifically, prior research appears to as-
sume that powerfulness is the driving causal force behind the effects of
power and that inferences for low power linearly follow from high
power. Such assumptions, in turn, may have influenced the ways in
which theories of social power have been formulated, studies have been
designed, and inferences have been drawn from data. To more sys-
tematically evaluate whether there is merit to these claims, we conduct
a quantitative review of past social power research published in man-
agement, psychology, and marketing journals. Using frequency and
content analyses, we assess how extant research has theorized about
power, what study designs have been used to test these theories, and
how power effects have been attributed in the published literature. Our
analyses suggest that the literature’s focus on powerfulness has indeed
led to one-sided theory development, study designs limiting our ability
to draw theoretical inferences for low-power individuals, and potential
inconsistencies in the literature.
Based on these inductively derived insights, we develop a theore-
tical model of low power by conceptually separating it from high
power. Specifically, we propose that although high- and low-power
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individuals are different in many respects, including the amount of
agency they enjoy and the influence they have over others, they also
share certain similarities. Both high- and low-power individuals are part
of asymmetric, unequal-power relationships. The common experience
of such a relationship is proposed to elicit (in domains we specify) si-
milar psychological experiences, judgments, and behaviors, compared
to individuals who are in symmetric, equal-power relationships.
Building on social exchange theories (Blau, 1964; Coleman, 1994; Cook
& Yamagishi, 1992; Emerson, 1976; Homans, 1961; Kelley & Thibaut,
1978), we propose that unequal-power relationships (versus equal-
power relationships) are purposive and individuals primarily enter and
maintain these relationships for self-interested reasons. We thus argue
that unequal-power relationships increase the salience of instrumental
goals, promote competitive attitudes, and lead to the emergence of
exchange rules (relative to equal-power relationships). Based on this
distinction between unequal- and equal-power relationships, we then
derive predictions for when being high in power and low in power lead
to similar (rather than opposite) judgments and behaviors. Finally, we
conduct two high-powered experiments (one of which being a pre-re-
gistered replication using a different subject pool) to provide an initial
test of this framework. In these experiments, we examine two con-
sequences of power – action orientation and objectification – for which
it remains unclear whether low power linearly follows from high
power, because prior experiments testing these consequences used
study designs that did not include low power.
Our research makes several contributions to the social power lit-
erature. First, it quantitatively evaluates extant theories, study designs,
and the attribution of results in social power research, highlighting a
focus on high-power individuals and an insufficient understanding of
low-power individuals. Second, we revisit and build on micro-socio-
logical conceptualizations of power (e.g., Coleman, 1994; Cook &
Yamagishi, 1992) to develop a theoretical model, which proposes that
high- and low-power states emerge within the context of unequal-power
relationships and that such relationships come with shared psycholo-
gical experiences and behavioral schemata that categorically differ
from equal-power relationships. The majority of recent power research
tends to refer to micro-sociological perspectives on power only in
passing and we believe that integrating recent empirical evidence with
these foundational perspectives provides new insights into the psy-
chology of being in unequal-power relationships and, in turn, helps il-
luminate the psychological consequences of being low in power. Based
on the distinction between unequal- and equal-power relationships, we
then derive several propositions for the effects of low power that open
new lines of inquiry for future research. Third, our theoretical frame-
work serves as a heuristic guide for researchers to more systematically
delineate when high and low power likely lead to opposite effects and
when they may lead to similar effects. Finally, we discuss the theoretical
and methodological implications for future power research. We suggest
ways in which the psychology of low power can be systematically in-
corporated into future theories of social power. We also discuss relevant
methodological considerations, such as the use of more nuanced study
designs and the selection of appropriate control conditions.
2. Preoccupied with the powerful?
People with power hold prominent positions in society. We read
about them in the news, learn from them in the classroom, are affected
by their decisions, and often strive to emulate them. Because the actions
and decisions of the powerful tend to be more consequential compared
to individuals with less power (Schwartz, Tesser, & Powell, 1982;
Spiegel & Machotka, 1974; Van Vugt, 2006), the powerful capture our
imagination and attention (Dépret & Fiske, 1999; Fiske & Dépret, 1996;
Hall, Carter, & Horgan, 2001). People in positions of high power also
tend to be perceptually more salient than people low in power. For
example, the offices of powerful CEOs are often situated on higher
floors and a judge's seat in the courtroom is elevated to differentiate
them from others (Fiske, 2004; Schwartz, 1981). Experimental evidence
also suggests that the powerful, relative to those with less power, are
more likely to stand out in social settings (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld,
Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007).
And because perceptual salience attracts causal attributions (Pryor &
Kriss, 1977; Taylor & Fiske, 1975, 1978), past research may have been
inclined to explain the world through the eyes of the powerful, giving
rise to a trend in research to explain the consequences of high power
while leaving the distinct consequences of low power unexplored.
2.1. Does the literature focus more on high than low power? A quantitative
review of the social power literature
If past research has indeed placed more emphasis on studying high-
relative to low-power individuals, then this tendency is likely reflected
in how theories of social power have been constructed, studies have
been designed, and inferences have been drawn from data. We con-
ducted a quantitative review of past social power research to gauge the
degree to which high power, relative to low power, has been at the
center of research attention.
2.1.1. Focus of past review articles
First, we systematically examined the extent to which theoretical
review articles on social power have focused on high power relative to
low power. Since reviews reflect the central themes and debates in the
literature (Webster & Watson, 2002), they should give insight into the
extent to which the field of social power has focused on the two op-
posing sides of the power spectrum. Specifically, we calculated the re-
lative frequency of words related to high power (i.e., “high power,”
“powerful,” “powerfulness,” “have power,” “more power”) relative to
low power-related words (i.e., “low power,” “powerless,” “power-
lessness,” “lack power,” “less power”) in ten major reviews of social
power.1 We found that high-power-related words were used more fre-
quently (63.6%) than low-power-related words (36.4%).
Although this analysis provides a preliminary indication that past
research may have put more emphasis on studying powerfulness, we
also conducted more systematic analyses. One way to gauge a field’s
focus is to quantitatively review (a) which conditions (i.e., high power,
low power, control) have been included in experimental designs and (b)
to which experimental condition effects have been attributed to. Both
experimental designs and effect attributions are directly guided by the
literature’s assumptions and expectations about the effects of power. If
high power and low power are of equal interest, then we would expect
to find an approximately equal number of study designs that contrast
both high- and low-power conditions to a control condition. However, if
the literature focuses primarily on high power, then we would expect to
find more study designs that compare high power to either low power
or a control condition. Similarly, if there is an equal interest in high and
low power, then we would also expect an approximately balanced
discussion of study results in terms of whether each state is responsible
for an effect.
2.1.2. Frequency of study designs used
To examine whether past studies were primarily designed to assess
the effects of high or low power, we conducted an extensive literature
search to retrieve relevant published studies in which social power
served as the independent variable. First, we searched major academic
databases (e.g., PsycINFO, Google Scholar) for articles published in a
pre-determined list of 19 journals in organizational behavior (e.g.,
1 The following reviews were included: Anderson and Brion (2014);
Bunderson and Reagans (2011); Fiske (2010); Galinsky, Chou, Halevy, and Van
Kleef (2012); Galinsky et al. (2015); Hirsh, Galinsky, and Zhong (2011); Keltner
et al. (2003); Magee and Smith (2013); Magee and Galinsky (2008); Sturm and
Antonakis (2015).
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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Academy of
Management Journal), psychology (e.g., Journal of Personality of Social
Psychology, Psychological Science), and marketing (e.g., Journal of
Consumer Research; see Appendix A for the complete journal list). We
used the following search term: power* OR dependence OR status OR
hierarch* OR control. The retrieval was conducted on February 2, 2015
and included all articles available on or prior to that date. Second, we
hand-searched the reference sections of review articles to identify ad-
ditional studies. Third, we searched the abstracts of the considered
publication outlets to make sure we did not miss any relevant papers.
Fourth, we searched the websites and publication lists of all authors in
our sample to identify “in press” manuscripts. The final sample included
399 studies published in 153 articles (see Appendix B for a list of ar-
ticles included). Note that in our review, we were interested in studies
that compared different levels of power (i.e., compared high and/or low
power to a control condition, or high and low power to each other). We
did not consider research that examined power distance (e.g., Lian,
Ferris, & Brown, 2012) or power at the institutional level (e.g., Casciaro
& Piskorski, 2005).
Subsequently, we categorized the studies based on their experi-
mental designs (see Fig. 1). We distinguish between “three-cell designs”
(studies using three experimental conditions) and two different types of
“two-cell designs” (studies using two experimental conditions). We find
that 68 studies (17.0%) used three-cell designs comparing both high
and low power to a control condition (i.e., HP vs. C vs. LP). Such de-
signs have the advantage that they not only give insight into whether
there was a difference between high and low power but the presence of
a control condition gives insight into the directionality of an effect
(Mullen & Monin, 2016; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).
The remaining 331 (83.0%) studies use one of two different types of
two-cell designs. One type of two-cell design “focuses” on assessing the
effects of either high power (i.e., HP vs. C) or low power (i.e., C vs. LP)
relative to a control condition. We refer to these designs as “focus de-
signs.” Focus designs were used in 74 (18.6%) of the studies in our
sample. One disadvantage of focus designs is that they do not provide
reliable insight into the counterfactual of what would have happened
had the other power condition been included (Schmid Mast, Jonas, &
Hall, 2009).
The second type of two-cell design compares high power to low
power (i.e., HP vs. LP) and was used in the remaining 257 (64.4%) of
studies. We refer to such designs as “donut designs” to reflect the fact
that “they are missing a crucial element in the middle” (Mullen &
Monin, 2016, p. 368). Donut designs have the disadvantage of making
directional attribution impossible since it is unclear whether the ob-
served effect was driven by the high- or low-power condition (or both).
A more systematic examination of focus and donut designs provides
insight into whether high or low power is studied more frequently.
First, if there is indeed a greater emphasis on studying powerfulness, we
should observe a relatively greater percentage of high-power focus
designs (i.e., HP vs. C) than low-power focus designs (i.e., LP vs. C). Our
findings are consistent with this idea: of the studies that compared only
one of the power conditions to a control condition, 95.9% (71 studies)
focused on high power, whereas only 4.1% (3 studies) studied low
power.
2.1.3. Effect attributions in past studies
A second indicator that research has largely focused on under-
standing the powerful would be a tendency to conclude that high power
is the dominant causal force behind power’s extensive effects. Such
conclusions are likely reflected in the way effects have been attributed
in donut-design studies (i.e., HP vs. LP), which leave the directionality
of an effect unclear (Mullen & Monin, 2016). To test this, we content-
analyzed the 257 studies2 using donut designs to assess how the effects
in these studies were attributed. Specifically, we coded the individual
study discussions by whether the mean difference between high and
low power was interpreted as a consequence of experiencing high
power (e.g., “high power reduced persuasion to strong arguments”), as
a consequence of being low in power (e.g., “these findings show […]
that powerlessness leads to metastereotyping”), whether an equal at-
tribution was made (e.g., “there was a significant difference in decep-
tion between both [power] conditions”), or whether the study discus-
sion did not attribute the effect to any of the power conditions.
In line with the previous analyses, we found that more than half of
the studies (52.5%) attributed their outcomes to high power – even
though effect directionality cannot be reliably inferred from such de-
signs (see Fig. 2). The remaining studies either attributed their effects to
low power (6.2%), attributed their effects equally to both high and low
power (28.1%), or did not attribute the effect to either power condition
(13.2%).
Although we conducted the analyses above at the individual study
level, similar patterns emerge at the paper level. Of the 153 papers
included in our sample, less than a third (48 articles; 31.4%) included at
least one study that systematically compared a low-power condition to
a control condition (i.e., used either a “HP vs. C vs. LP” design or a “C
vs. LP” design) which would have provided insight into the relative
contribution of low power to an observed effect. Thus, more than two
thirds of the articles analyzed may not allow drawing reliable conclu-
sions about the consequences of low-power states.
Fig. 1. Frequency of study designs in our sample (N=399 studies).
2 Fifteen studies did not have an individual study discussion and could thus
not be coded. The coded sample consisted of 242 studies.
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Overall, these analyses suggest that social power research centers
around high power. We observed this preoccupation with powerfulness
in theorizing (i.e., reviews on social power contain more references to
high power than low power), study designs (most focus design studies
tested the effect of powerfulness), and causal attributions (in more than
half of the studies using donut designs, effects were attributed to high
power). While there are good reasons to study powerfulness, our
quantitative review of the literature shows that we have a limited un-
derstanding of individuals who are low in power.
2.2. Why should we study low-power individuals?
The lack of a systematic investigation of low power as a state may
have negative implications for the study of social power for several
theoretical, methodological, and practical reasons. Theoretically, it is
important to study low power because most popular theories of social
power are based on linearity assumptions, according to which the
consequences of high power and low power represent opposite ends of a
linear continuum (Guinote, 2007; Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Smith,
2013). Consider the often-cited approach-inhibition theory of power
(Keltner et al., 2003). This theory posits that powerfulness leads to the
activation of the behavioral approach system, a neuropsychological
system that is believed to regulate behavior related to safety, sex, food,
aggression, and attachment. The same theory proposes, “for com-
plementary reasons, the lack of power should be associated with in-
creased inhibition” (Keltner et al., 2003, p.269). Inhibition (here re-
ferring to the Behavioral Inhibition System) relates to an alarm-threat
system that is activated by punishment, uncertainty, and threat. The
approach-inhibition theory of power states that these two underlying
behavioral systems are complements and represent opposite ends of a
continuum that linearly maps onto the high/low-power continuum.
In contrast to this assumption, past research on approach and in-
hibition argues that the two systems represent distinct structures in the
nervous system and should be presumed to be orthogonal forces (Carver
& White, 1994; Gray, 1987). Thus, the idea that high power activates
the behavioral approach system does not automatically imply that low
power leads to behavioral inhibition. This may have contributed to the
emergence of findings that are inconsistent with this theory (Anderson
& Brion, 2014; Galinsky et al., 2015; Guinote & Vescio, 2010). For
example, powerful people tend to engage in more abstract information
processing than low-power people (e.g., Magee, Milliken, & Lurie,
2010; Smith & Trope, 2006). Yet, the approach-inhibition theory of
power cannot easily explain why the activation of the behavioral
inhibition system would lead to greater systematic processing among
low-power individuals (for a more detailed discussion and additional
examples, see Magee & Smith, 2013).
Placing more emphasis on understanding the psychology of low
power is also important from a methodological perspective. As our re-
view has shown, the literature is dominated by studies that use donut
designs (HP vs. LP) in which the observed effects are attributed to
powerfulness. In more than half of these cases, effects are attributed to
the powerful even though the use of donut designs makes it challenging
to infer which power condition was responsible for the effect. Thus,
effects previously attributed to high power may in fact be a con-
sequence of low power, which would only become evident if one does
not automatically assume that powerfulness was the driving causal
force. In addition, studies that used high-power focus designs (HP vs. C)
do not provide much insight into the behavior of low-power in-
dividuals. While studying powerful people is not problematic in and of
itself, our analyses show a significant proportion of social power re-
search cannot tell us much about the consequences of having little
power.
Finally, there are practical reasons to study low-power individuals,
as lacking power tends to be a more common psychological state than
feeling powerful. For example, most animal and human power hier-
archies tend to be pyramid shaped such that those at the bottom are
more abundant than those at the top (de Waal, 2007; Magee & Galinsky,
2008). Social inequality across the world is also on the rise (OECD,
2011), leading to a higher number of individuals that control few re-
sources. In addition, a recent study that observed people in everyday
situations over several days found that it is more likely for people to
find themselves in low-power than high-power positions (Smith &
Hofmann, 2016). Thus, by focusing research efforts on those who are
powerful, emerging theories may be limited in their predictive validity
to a narrow subset of people.
To address these shortcomings, we devote the remainder of the
paper to developing a theoretical account of the consequences of ex-
periencing low power by conceptually separating low from high power.
3. The psychology of low power
In our conceptualization of low power, we revisit micro-sociological
research suggesting that human relationships are formed through a
process of negotiated interactions between interdependent individuals
who are trying to maximize gains through the exchange of resources
(Blau, 1964; Coleman, 1994; Emerson, 1962, 1976; Homans, 1961;
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Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Molm, Peterson, & Takahashi, 1999). Although
current research on social power often refers to these conceptualiza-
tions, it does not go much further than stating that high-power in-
dividuals have more control over resources than low-power individuals
(e.g., Anderson & Brion, 2014, p. 3; Magee & Galinsky, 2008, p. 361;
Sturm & Antonakis, 2015, p. 139). However, one direct implication of
the idea that there are differences in the amount of resources in-
dividuals control is that, whenever two people interact with the pur-
pose of exchanging valued resources, there is a varying amount of
asymmetry between them. Although asymmetry can be continuous,
here we focus on the distinction between asymmetric relationships and
symmetric relationships (Blau, 1964; Hall, 1985; Zitek & Tiedens,
2012).
Asymmetric relationships are characterized by “more” and “less”
such that one individual controls, or has access to, more resources than
another (Hall, 1985). In contrast, symmetric relationships involve in-
teractions between individuals that have an equal amount of resources.
Unequal-power relationships constitute one inherently asymmetric type
of social relation, because one individual tends to have a dispropor-
tionate amount of influence over another individual (March, 1955;
Emerson, 1962). An example of such a relationship within the context
of an organization is the relationships between a supervisor and his/her
subordinate. In contrast, equal-power relationships are inherently
symmetric. In equal-power relationships, each individual controls a
similar amount of resources and exerts the same amount of influence
(Blau, 1964). An example of an equal-power relationship in a work
context is the relationship between two peers, or colleagues.
Our quantitative review of the social power literature revealed that
the focus on explaining the consequences of powerfulness has led to
comparisons between one state of an unequal-power relationship (high
power) to either another state of an unequal-power relationship (low
power) or states and situations where power differences are absent
(control conditions). Such comparisons are feasible in terms of deriving
insights for low power if one can reliably assume that situations of high
power, equal power, and low power operate on a linear continuum in
which equal power lies “in the middle” between high and low power.
We are not claiming that there are no reasons to make such an as-
sumption. In many situations, high-, equal-, and low-power individuals
vary along meaningful dimensions, such as the amount of agency they
enjoy and in their ability to influence others. Because of these differ-
ences, high- and low-power individuals should, at times, experience
their positions in opposite ways and, in turn, behave differently.
Judgments and behaviors directly emerging from differences between
high and low power should result in linear effects (e.g.,
HP > C > LP), whereby inferences for low power linearly follow from
high power.
Although there are some reasons to expect linear differences across
levels of power, we propose that the very nature of being in an unequal-
power relationship – irrespective of one’s level of power – can lead to
similar experiences for high- and low-power individuals compared to
individuals in an equal-power relationship. Fiske’s (1992) Unified
Theory of Social Relations suggests that all aspects of social relations
can be described by a finite number of elementary models. Thus, de-
pending on the nature of a relationship, different schemata, rules, and
grammars become salient that influence how people in such relation-
ships think, feel, and act. Directly building on frameworks of social
exchange (Blau, 1964; Coleman, 1994; Emerson, 1976; Homans, 1961;
Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) and the distinction between symmetric and
asymmetric relationships (Blau, 1964; Hall, 1985; Zitek & Tiedens,
2012), we propose that certain schemata governing unequal-power
relationships fundamentally differ from those of equal-power relation-
ships. Specifically, we argue that self-interest is more salient in unequal-
power (relative to equal-power) relationships, as individuals are more
likely to enter and maintain unequal-power relationships with the
purpose of furthering their own goals (Coleman, 1994). Heightened
self-interest salience, in turn, has extensive consequences for behavior
of individuals who are part of unequal-power (vs. equal-power) re-
lationships, such as an increased salience of instrumental goals, the
formation of competitive attitudes, and the emergence of exchange
rules. One important implication of the idea that unequal-power re-
lationships are governed by fundamentally different schemata than
equal-power relationships, is that both high- and low-power individuals
may share common experiences which will lead to comparable judg-
ments and behaviors in a specified set of situations. Conceptually, this
means that power may also lead to curvilinear effects (e.g., HP >
C < LP), whereby inferences for low power no longer linearly follow
from high power. Note that in making these arguments, we constrain
our theoretical model to the domain of relationships within (or be-
tween) organizations, such as the examples given above. In the General
Discussion, we discuss in more depth whether and how our model
might apply to other types of relationships (e.g., family relationships).
In the following, we first review some of the high/low-power dif-
ferences past research has relied on and discuss the kinds of behaviors
for which we can expect linear effects. Next, we develop arguments for
when and why high and low power may lead to similar experiences and
behavioral consequences. Finally, we report an experiment to illustrate
that although low-power individuals sometimes behave in an opposite
way to high-power individuals (thereby producing a linear effect), at
other times they behave in a similar way (thereby producing a curvi-
linear effect).
3.1. How low power is different from high power
Exchange theories highlight that many interpersonal interactions
take place between interdependent individuals who are each trying to
maximize gains through the exchange of mutually-beneficial resources
(Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976; Homans, 1961; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978).
In such interactions, the amount of control an individual has over re-
sources varies, with high-power individuals controlling more resources
valuable to other (less powerful) individuals. Take the employment
relationship as an example, in which an employee controls effort, skill,
and time that she exchanges with an employer who controls money,
security, and advancement possibilities the employee values. Typically,
the employer controls more valuable resources than the employee (al-
though in a few cases this may not be true). This asymmetry in control
over valuable resources leads to several differences between high- and
low-power individuals, relative to one another and relative to in-
dividuals who control an equal amount of resources.
One difference that directly follows from asymmetries in control is
the amount of agency an individual has. Agency refers to an individual’s
discretion, or freedom, to act in a self-directed and autonomous way
(Bakan, 1966; Sturm & Antonakis, 2015). To act in a self-directed way,
having more resources is useful because goal attainment requires re-
sources and more resources require less resource pooling and co-
ordination among actors (Foa & Foa, 2012; Sahlins, 1965; Yamagishi &
Cook, 1993). Consequently, because individuals high in power control a
lot of valued resources, they should exhibit relatively higher levels of
agency compared to individuals low in power and individuals in si-
tuations without power differences (Rucker, Galinsky, & Dubois, 2012).
In contrast, individuals who are low in power are dependent on others’
resources to achieve their goals and, therefore, have fewer opportu-
nities to act in self-directed ways, relative to individuals high in power
and individuals in situations without power differences. Several studies
provide support for the idea that high- and low-power individuals differ
in their tendency to behave agentically (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee,
2003; Magee et al., 2007). One study, for example, found that partici-
pants who recalled an experience of high power subsequently were
more likely to make the first offer in a negotiation than participants
who recalled a low-power experience (Magee et al., 2007). The idea
that power is positively related to agency suggests that we can expect
high- and low-power individuals to behave in opposite ways for a broad
range of agentic behaviors, such as the extent to which people act upon
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their dispositions (Guinote, Weick, & Cai, 2012), express their opinions
authentically (Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011), take initiative in com-
petitive social interactions (Magee et al., 2007) and change their en-
vironment to fit their needs (Galinsky et al., 2003).
Another way in which high- and low-power individuals differ re-
lative to each other and to individuals in situations without power
differences is by the amount of social influence they can exert. Influence
refers to the ability to change other people’s thoughts and behavior
(Fiske, 2010). Although the ability to influence others can emerge from
many sources (e.g., argumentative skill, liking, reciprocity), asymmetric
control over valuable resources necessarily affords one the discretion
and means to influence other’s actions (Tost, 2015). For example, va-
luable resources can include money which allows one to reward an
individual for compliance; it can include legitimate authority which
obligates others to accept one’s influence; or it can include expertise
which gives one the ability to change the cognitive structures of others
(French & Raven, 1959). Consequently, the amount of social influence
one has over others should be positively related to one’s relative power.
Indeed, one study found that participants given the ability to reward
and punish another individual attempted to influence that individual
more frequently than those who did not have this ability (Kipnis, 1972).
Powerholders were also more likely to influence their subordinates to
confirm their expectancies about themselves than were subordinates
(Copeland, 1994). Furthermore, another study found that the outcome
of a dyadic decision-making task was more consistent with the initial
decision of the individual who was given control over resources (the
ability to allocate $10 between him/herself and the partner) than the
individual who had no control over resources. In other words, the high-
power individual had more influence over the decision of the low-
power individual than vice versa (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). Collec-
tively, these studies imply that the amount of social influence an in-
dividual can exert is directly tied to the amount of resources one con-
trols relative to others. Thus, individuals high (low) in power should
exert more (less) influence on others than those with an equal amount
of power. Consequently, we can expect to observe linear effects of
power for a broad range of behaviors related to social influence, such as
the extent to which people obey others (Milgram, 1963), can persuade
others (Lammers, Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2013), affect collective
decision-making processes (Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, &
Blackstone, 1994), and get selected as leaders (Bass, 2008).
Although we have highlighted two important ways in which high-
and low-power individuals differ from each other and from those in
situations without power differences, there may be other such differ-
ences. For example, the very nature of being in an unequal-power re-
lationship implies that high and low power individuals occupy different
relative positions in an implicit or explicit rank ordering. Similar to
time, which is typically represented on a horizontal dimension from left
to right (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002), people construe power as ver-
tical space ranging from the bottom to the top (Giessner & Schubert,
2007). Indeed, leaders supervise their employees and are higher up in
the hierarchy, while employees are subordinates and lower down in the
hierarchy. In addition, having more rather than less power can come
with more responsibility for the outcomes of others who depend on
resources (Sassenberg, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2012; Torelli & Shavitt,
2010; Zhong, Magee, Maddux, & Galinsky, 2006). Irrespective of the
dimension on which high and low power differ, however, the resulting
psychological experiences and subsequent behaviors will likely follow a
linear pattern.
3.2. How low power is similar to high power
We believe that there are also notable similarities between high- and
low-power individuals, relative to individuals who are not in an un-
equal-power relationship. Unequal-power relationships (e.g., those
between a supervisor and a subordinate) can be characterized as rela-
tively high in self-interest while equal-power relationships (e.g., those
between colleagues) are relatively low in self-interest. Specifically, the
type and structure of a relationship an individual is in serves as a
contextual cue that can make salient different knowledge structures,
behavioral scripts, expectations, and goals (Fiske, 1992). The spreading
activation account of memory (Anderson, 1983) suggests that being in
an unequal-power (vs. equal-power) relationship should make power
differentials more evident and consequentially increase the accessibility
of other power-related cognitions, including those associated with
gaining and maintaining power. This proposition is also in line with
past research showing that power is a mental construct that can be
activated by contextual cues (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Bargh,
Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995; Galinsky et al., 2008, 2015), and that
both high- and low-power-related cues can activate the same under-
lying mental construct (Smith & Trope, 2006).
Early formulations of social exchange theory highlight how cogni-
tions and motives related to self-interest are salient in resource ex-
changes. Accordingly, individuals enter and maintain relationships in
which potential rewards (e.g., satisfaction and gratification) from the
interaction exceed the expected costs (e.g., effort, opportunity costs;
Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). When rewards of a relationship decrease, or
costs increase, or when alternative relationships offer better outcomes,
people are expected to exit exchanges. The tendency to focus on re-
wards and costs as well as who controls them, is particularly pro-
nounced in unequal-power relationships. In these interactions, because
resources are distributed unequally and the interaction partners are
aware of this, the focus shifts to improving individual outcomes ac-
cruing from the interaction either by gaining access to previously un-
attainable resources in the case of low-power individuals, or by stra-
tegically sharing resources to increase the other person’s commitment
to the relationship in the case of high-power individuals (Thibaut &
Kelley, 1959, p.111). Being in an unequal-power relationship in-
centivizes individuals to focus on gaining and maintaining their control
over resources, which should increase the cognitive salience of self-
interest. The increased salience of self-interest, in turn, may elicit be-
haviors directed at improving individuals’ own outcomes (Thibaut &
Kelley, 1959). For instance, both high- and low-power individuals fre-
quently engage in ingratiation behaviors (such as flattery, self-en-
hancement, and modesty) to increase their attractiveness as an inter-
action partner (Jones, 1964; Jones, Gergen, & Jones, 1963; Jones,
Gergen, Gumpert, & Thibaut, 1965; Stires & Jones, 1969). Such beha-
viors, however, are less common among equal-power relationships
(e.g., Bohra & Pandey, 1984).
In contrast, different (and sometimes less strong) rules, scripts, and
goals should be made salient by being in relationships in which power is
balanced (i.e., equal-power relationships). In such relationships, self-
gain concerns should be relatively less pronounced as there may be
strong normative expectations that discourage self-enhancing motives
and the expectations that come with it. When power is balanced, people
should treat others as equals, be more concerned about the welfare of
others, and give benefits to others non-contingently (Fiske, 1992). For
example, people react negatively to others who engage in self-inter-
ested behavior (e.g., making a request for a benefit) when they are in an
equal-power relationship (e.g., between peers; see Clark & Mills, 1979).
The reason for such negative reactions is that the pursuit of self-interest
in power-balanced relationships creates inequalities and discomfort
that would have to be repaid (e.g., Walster, Walster, & Berscheid,
1978). Although any type of relationship can be more or less self-in-
terested, the micro-sociological theories on power and social exchange
reviewed above suggest that unequal-power relationships are char-
acterized by relatively higher self-interest salience when compared to
relationships in which power is balanced. Consequently, we propose
that the heightened salience of self-interest in unequal-power (vs.
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equal-power) relationships may in turn lead to similar perceptions and
behaviors for both high- and low-power individuals.3 We elaborate on
these consequences in the following sections.
3.2.1. Unequal-power (vs. equal-power) relationships increase the salience
of instrumental goals
One direct consequence of the heightened self-interest salience in
unequal-power relationships is that individuals in such a relationship
(relative to those in equal-power relationships or other types of re-
lationships) may come to develop a more instrumental attitude toward
their social environment. By instrumental we mean the extent to which
other social actors are perceived as “useful” towards one’s goals
(Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008). Because individuals in unequal-power re-
lationships enter these relationships voluntarily and do so for self-gain
(Coleman, 1994; Cook & Yamagishi, 1992; Molm et al., 1999), both
parties in such a relationship should see the other party as an instru-
ment, or a “means to an end.” There is little reason to expect that the
average employee is less instrumental than the average employer, or
thinks about their relationship in less instrumental ways. An employer
likely sees the employee as a provider of labor while the employee sees
the employer as a source of income. Instrumental goals should thus be
similarly salient to both the employer (high power) and the employee
(low power).
There is evidence supporting the idea that individuals in unequal-
power relationships view other people as instrumental. For example,
one study found that people who recalled being the high-power party in
an unequal-power relationship construed their counterpart in a more
goal-relevant way than individuals who recalled being in an equal-
power relationship (Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Study 1). While this study
did not include a low-power condition, there is indirect evidence sug-
gesting that the same goal-relevant construal occurs for both high- and
low-power individuals. For instance, social network research suggests
that instrumental relations, which focus on the exchange of work-re-
lated resources, tend to emerge between two actors in an asymmetrical
relationship, while symmetrical relationships tend to focus on social
support rather than on access to information and valuable resources
(Ibarra & Andrews, 1993). In addition, Pitesa and Thau (2013a) found
no notable differences between high- and low-power individuals’ ten-
dency to make instrumental decisions.4 Given that unequal-power re-
lationships (relative to those in equal-power relationships) are entered
and maintained for the purpose of gain and that individuals in such
relationships tend to have a more instrumental worldview, we should
expect similar tendencies among high- and low-power individuals for
judgments and behaviors related to instrumental attitudes, such as
objectification of the self (Inesi et al., 2014), objectification of other
social actors (Gruenfeld et al., 2008), questioning of others’ generous
acts (Inesi, Gruenfeld, & Galinsky, 2012), and seeing interaction part-
ners as fungible (Nussbaum, 1999).
3.2.2. Unequal-power (vs. equal-power) relationships promote competitive
attitudes
Another direct consequence of the self-interest salience in unequal-
power relationships is that individuals in such relationships (relative to
those in relationships without power differences) may develop more
competitive attitudes. People have a tendency to assume that the mo-
tives of others resemble their own motives (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel,
2000; Schelling, 1980; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Self-interested in-
dividuals are thus more likely to assume that others are motivated by
self-interest as well, thereby giving rise to competitive attitudes
(Deutsch, 1949; Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010). Indeed, individuals
who pursue self-interest-related goals reported higher feelings of com-
petition and lower feelings of cooperation than those who pursue col-
lective goals or no specific goals (Mitchell & Silver, 1990).
Because unequal-power relationships cause both high- and low-
power individuals to construe their relationship in a more self-inter-
ested way, relative to those in relationships without power differences,
they are likely to exhibit more competitive attitudes and behavior.
Research on dyads and groups provides support for this idea (for a re-
view, see Anderson & Brown, 2010). For example, individuals who were
part of small groups with an unequal-power structure (relative to
groups with an egalitarian structure) were more likely to report that the
others only cared about their own outcomes and that they perceived
their interactions to be more competitive. As a consequence, unequal-
power groups were less cooperative and achieved lower individual and
collective outcomes than equal-power groups (Mannix, 1993). Similar
observations were made in negotiations (e.g., Giebels, De Dreu, & Van
De Vliert, 2000; Lawler & Yoon, 1996; Mannix & Neale, 1993;
McAlister, Bazerman, & Fader, 1986) and economic games (e.g.,
Sheposh & Gallo, 1973; Tedeschi, Lindskold, Horai, & Gahagan, 1969).
For instance, one study found that unequal-power dyads cooperated
less in maximizing joint outcomes and focused more on their individual
payoffs than equal-power dyads (Mannix & Neale, 1993). Thus, because
of the more pronounced competitive attitudes in unequal-power re-
lationships, we should expect both high- and low-power individuals
(relative to those in situations without power differences) to exhibit
similar tendencies and behaviors in this domain, such as reduced trust
(Inesi et al., 2012), less information sharing (Anicich, Swaab, &
Galinsky, 2015), fewer concessions in negotiations (Lawler & Yoon,
1996), and lower contributions to public resource pools (Mannix,
1993).
3.2.3. Unequal-power (vs. equal-power) relationships are governed by the
rules of exchange
To mitigate the potential negative consequences of self-interest, we
propose that over time, people in unequal-power relationships agree on
rules and norms that govern the exchange of resources. Social psy-
chological research suggests that in relationships that are formed to
exchange things (such as goods, services, and other resources; see Foa &
Foa, 2012), benefits are given under the assumption that comparable
benefits will be returned as repayment (i.e., quid pro quo; see Clark &
Mils, 1993; Goffman, 1961). The receipt of a benefit incurs a “debt” that
must be balanced (Clark & Mills, 1979). Because people enter unequal-
power relationships to further their own self-interest (Coleman, 1994;
Cook & Yamagishi, 1992; Molm et al., 1999), they expect to be repaid
for the resources they invested, as they would have not otherwise
committed to the relationship. For example, an employer is likely un-
willing to pay a salary to an employee who does not get the job done
and an employee would not show up for work in the absence of ap-
propriate compensation. In relationships in which self-interest and the
subsequent emergence of exchange norms is less pronounced, on the
other hand, benefits are given non-contingently without expectations of
repayment (Clark & Mills, 1979). Consistent with the idea that “quid
pro quo” exchange rules are more likely to apply to power-unequal
relationships, powerful individuals evaluated unilateral benefits re-
ceived from a low-power individual more negatively than from in-
dividuals in power-equal relationships (Inesi et al., 2012). Another
study showed that people in equal-power relationships were more likely
to give token gifts in a context where the other person did not have the
opportunity to reciprocate than people in unequal-power relationships
3 Note that heightened self-interest in unequal-power relationships may not
always translate into similar behaviors for both high- and low-power in-
dividuals. High- and low-power individuals may have differential goals (e.g.,
such as approaching gains versus avoiding losses; see Keltner et al., 2003) and
heightened self-interest may facilitate the pursuit of these differential goals. The
purpose of our framework is to theoretically account for the possibility that high
and low power can lead to similar experiences and outcomes and we believe
this to be particularly the case in the domains specified in our model.
4 Although in another set of studies (Pitesa & Thau, 2013b) the powerful were
more likely to recommend others to make investment decisions that benefitted
themselves, these decisions were confounded with higher levels of risk-taking
and high power was not contrasted with low power.
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(Lawler & Yoon, 1996). Based on this logic, we should be able to ob-
serve similar outcomes for both high- and low-power individuals (re-
lative to individuals in situations without power differences) for be-
haviors that are related to this exchange rule, such as how people
respond to favors (Walster et al., 1978), whether and how much they
are willing to help another person (Clark, Ouellette, Powell, & Milberg,
1987), and how people react to withheld benefits (Williamson, Clark,
Pegalis, & Behan, 1996).
Another implication of the heightened self-interest salience in unequal-
power relationships is that not only are benefits rendered with an ex-
pectation of returns, but it is also more likely that returns are expected
within a specified time frame and that delays of returns are tolerated less
than in equal-power relationships. If a request for help by another in-
dividual is immediately followed by a counter-request, the debt created by
the original request is paid off. In unequal-power relationships, an im-
mediate return request would be a quid pro quo. In contrast, if a counter-
request is delayed in time, it is less likely to be connected to the initial
request and perceived as a way to extract free help (Aggarwal, 2004). The
opposite logic applies to equal-power relationships where self-interest is
relatively less salient. For example, research on communal relationships –
relationships in which equality and the welfare of others are primary
concerns and self-interest is inherently less important – suggests that an
immediate counter-request would be seen as repayment and thus violate
people’s normative expectations (Clark, 1981). A delayed repayment is
more likely to be seen as an expression of genuine need and thus complies
with communal norms (Aggarwal, 2004). Because unequal-power re-
lationships more likely follow the rules of exchange relationships than
equal-power relationships, we expect individuals who are part of unequal-
power relationships to anticipate more immediate repayment and to be
less tolerant of delays than individuals in equal-power relationships. Peers,
and individuals in other equal-power relationships, however, are not ex-
pected to repay the value they receive immediately (Blau, 1964; Clark,
1981). They should therefore be more tolerant of delays (Clark, 1981).
Although we have highlighted some of the consequences that directly
follow from the different rules governing unequal- and equal-power re-
lationships, there may be additional implications that follow from the dis-
tinction presented here. For example, unequal- and equal-power relation-
ships may vary in whether rewards are divided according to each person’s
input or according to needs, whether people keep track of each other’s
contributions, and whether people respond to other’s emotional states
(Aggarwal, 2004). Our theoretical framework is summarized in Table 1.
3.3. Predicting the consequences of low power
Our theorizing suggests that although high and low power individuals
differ from each other in many ways, being part of an unequal-power
relationship – irrespective of one’s level of power – can lead to funda-
mentally different psychological experiences and behaviors than when
power differences are absent. Thus, outcomes directly tied to differences in
the resources controlled by high- and low-power individuals, such as
judgments and behaviors related to agency and social influence, should
lead to linear effects (e.g., HP > C > LP). In this case, low power should
linearly follow from high power. For example, the extent to which an
individual expresses her opinion first in a social setting will (amongst other
things) depend on her level of power. The more (less) powerful the in-
dividual is, the more (less) agentically she can behave, and the more (less)
likely she will express her opinion first. In contrast, outcomes directly tied
to differences between unequal- and equal-power relations, such as judg-
ments and behaviors related to instrumental goals, competitive attitudes,
or rules of exchange, should lead to curvilinear effects (e.g.,
HP > C < LP). For example, the extent to which an individual objecti-
fies another social actor will (amongst other things) depend on the level of
instrumentality of a relationship. Because individuals in unequal-power
relationships tend to be more instrumental than those in equal-power re-
lationships, both high- and low-power individuals should be more likely to
objectify their counterpart relative to an individual in a power-equal re-
lationship. The logic is summarized in Fig. 3.
3.4. An empirical demonstration: action orientation and objectification
To provide an initial test of our framework, we conducted an ex-
periment examining the effects of social power on action orientation
and objectification. Our framework states that action orientation is
directly related to the amount of agency that is afforded by one’s power
position. The more (less) power one has, the more (less) freedom one
enjoys, and the more (less) action one can take. To test this prediction,
we chose to conceptually replicate a study in which only a high-power
condition was compared to a control condition and the consequences of
low power are thus unclear (Magee et al., 2007; Study 2). In this study,
action orientation was operationalized as the propensity to speak first
in a social setting. In line with our framework, we should be able to
expect an individual’s propensity to speak first to be positively and
linearly related to power, such that high-power individuals would be
the most likely to speak up while the low-power individuals would be
the least likely to speak up.
Table 1
Similarities between high power and low power and their consequences.
Similarities Logic Implications for low and high power Example consequences of low and
high power (relative to equal power)
Instrumentality Heightened self-interest salience in unequal-power
relationships, relative to equal-power relationships,
activates instrumental goals and behaviors associated with
these goals
Low- and high-power individuals are more
instrumental in their attitudes and behavior relative to
individuals in situations without power differences
▪ More objectification of the self
▪ More objectification of others
▪ More instrumental attributions
about others’ behaviors
▪ Higher perceived fungibility of
others
Competitiveness Greater self-interest salience in unequal-power
relationships evokes more competitive attitudes and
behaviors associated with these attitudes, when compared
to equal-power relationships
Low- and high-power individuals perceive and enact
their interactions in a more competitive way relative to
individuals in situations without power differences
▪ Reduced trust
▪ Less information sharing
▪ Reduced integrativeness of
negotiations
▪ Less cooperation in economic games
▪ Lower contributions to public goods
Rules of exchange Due to heightened self-interest in unequal-power
relationships, rules of exchange are more likely activated in
these relationships when compared to equal-power
relationships
Low- and high-power individuals are more likely to
assume that benefits given are repaid than individuals
in situations without power differences
▪ More negative reactions to favors
▪ Reduced willingness to help
▪ More negative reactions to withheld
benefits
▪ Increased speed of reciprocity
▪ Lower tolerance of delays
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Objectification, on the other hand, involves treating other people as
“instruments,” or seeing them as a means to an end (Fredrickson &
Roberts, 1997). More specifically, objectification is a social perceptual
process that involves “the splitting of a whole person into parts that
serve specific goals and functions for the observer” (Gruenfeld et al.,
2008, p.111). Prior research investigating the effect of power on ob-
jectification has found that being powerful leads to increased objecti-
fication of social targets (Bargh et al., 1995; Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Inesi
et al., 2014; Kipnis, 1972). This finding has been explained by the idea
that power activates approach tendencies that “increase approach ap-
praisals of instrumental objects, including other people” (Gruenfeld
et al., 2008, p.112). This logic suggests that people lower in power
should exhibit reduced approach tendencies and should therefore be
less inclined to objectify others. However, none of the 13 studies on
power and objectification we identified systematically compared the
effect of low power to a situation that does not involve power differ-
ences. Thus, although existing research suggests that high power in-
creases objectification and low power should thus decrease objectifi-
cation, little systematic research on the relationship between low power
and objectification has been conducted.
In contrast to extant research, our framework suggests that high-
and low-power states may in fact have comparable effects on an in-
dividual’s tendency to objectify others. According to the definition
above, objectification involves separating out aspects of a person that
can advance one’s goals. This implies that objectification is particularly
likely under conditions in which social actors are appraising their social
environment through the lens of self-interest. We argued earlier that, as
a consequence of the heightened salience of self-interest when being in
an unequal-power relationship, both high- and low-power individuals
tend to construe and enact their relationships in more instrumental
ways than people in an equal-power relationship. Picture the relation-
ship between a supervisor and her subordinate. Because the supervisor’s
focus in this relationship is instrumental in nature (e.g., completing a
project), she is more likely to focus on aspects of her subordinate that
serve her goal (e.g., the subordinate’s analytical skills). Similarly, be-
cause the subordinate’s goal in the relationship is similarly instrumental
in nature (e.g., earning a salary), the subordinate is likely to construe
the supervisor as a means to an end (e.g., a source of income). In
contrast, in equal-power relationships (e.g., between peers) where in-
dividuals are relatively less self-interested and instrumental goals
therefore less salient, individuals are less likely to appraise others in
terms of their goal-enhancing value. In sum, because instrumental goals
are more salient in unequal-power relationships due to the purposive
nature of those relationships and because objectification involves ap-
praising others in terms of their instrumental value (Fredrickson &
Roberts, 1997; Gruenfeld et al., 2008), we expect both high- and low-
power individuals to objectify their relational counterpart to a greater
extent than individuals in a power-equal relationship.
To test these predictions, we conducted an experiment employing a
widely-used experiential power manipulation and subsequently mea-
sured people’s tendency to speak up in a social setting (action or-
ientation) or objectify another individual. In both cases, the original
published studies left it unclear how someone in a low-power position
would respond. To enhance confidence in the study results, we ran the
same study design across two highly-powered samples recruited from
two different subject pools. In addition, the sampling and analysis
procedure for Sample 2 was preregistered before data collection. We
report all measures, studies, and data exclusions.
3.4.1. Methods
3.4.1.1. Sample 1
The first sample consisted of 900 participants5 recruited from
Amazon Mechanical Turk (mean age= 35.49, SD=1.49; 49.3% fe-
male). Participants received US$1.00 in exchange for their participa-
tion. Sample size was determined in advance based on a pretest.
3.4.1.2. Sample 2
The second sample consisted of 900 participants recruited from
Prolific Academic (mean age= 35.01, SD=11.55; 46.7% female).
Participants received £0.80 for their participation. Sample size, study
design, hypotheses, dependent measures, and analyses for this sample
were pre-registered on Open Science Framework before data collection.6
Across both samples, participants were randomly assigned to one of
the six cells of a 3 (power: high power vs. control vs. low power)× 2
(dependent measure: action orientation vs. objectification) between-
subjects design. Thus, each experimental cell had approximately 150
observations.
Fig. 3. Predicting the consequences of low power.
5 Because the availability of relevant personal memories of different power
episodes can enhance the effectiveness of recall manipulations (Lammers,
Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2017), participants of Sample 1 first had to pass a
“screening survey” in order to be able to participate in the study. The screening
survey asked participants whether they had ever been a superior, subordinate,
and a peer in their current or past job. Participants who responded “no” to any
of these questions were ineligible to participate. Thus, all 900 participants in
Sample 1 had relevant experiences to rely on during the power induction.
6 The pre-registration can be accessed here: https://osf.io/yk3u8/?view_
only=59ba572717c34ae8aae5bb42fcd8b6f6.
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3.4.1.3. Power manipulation
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three power condi-
tions in which they encountered a short writing task developed by
Gruenfeld et al. (2008, Study 1a). We directly adopted the high-power
and control manipulations from past research but added a low-power
manipulation to the design. In the high-power condition, participants
described a professional relationship in which their work partner re-
ports directly to them or in which they have power over their work
partner:
Please think of a professional relationship you have, or have had in the
past, that is hierarchical. The relationship should be one in which your
work partner either reports directly to you or in which you have dis-
proportionate power or control (or both) over him/her. Briefly describe
your partner, and the nature of your relationship in the space below.
In the control condition, participants were asked to describe a pro-
fessional relationship in which power was equal:
Please think of a professional relationship you have, or have had in the
past, that is not hierarchical. The relationship should be one in which you
and your work partner do not report directly to one another, nor does
one of you have disproportionate power or control over the other. Briefly
describe your partner, and the nature of your relationship, in the space
below.
Because the original study design only included a high-power and a
control condition, we developed a low-power condition by mirroring the
logic and wording of the high-power condition. Specifically, partici-
pants described a professional relationship in which they report directly
to their work partner or one in which their work partner has power over
them:
Please think of a professional relationship you have, or have had in the
past, that is hierarchical. The relationship should be one in which you
report either directly to your work partner or in which your work partner
has disproportionate power or control (or both) over you. Briefly de-
scribe your partner, and the nature of your relationship, in the space
below.
Next, participants were randomly assigned to complete one of two
dependent measures. Half of the participants responded to items mea-
suring their action orientation, and the other half responded to items
measuring their tendency to objectify.
3.4.1.4. Action orientation
In line with past research, we operationalized action orientation as
“…the inclination to assert oneself first in an interaction” (e.g., Magee
et al., 2007; Experiment 2). To measure participants’ tendency to move
first, participants rated the extent to which they would be inclined to
speak-up first in three different scenarios (Sample 1: α= .85, Sample 2:
α= .80). The scenarios were: “You are in a brainstorming meeting with
the person you just wrote about. How likely would you be to make the
first suggestion?”, “You and the person you just wrote about are on a
conference call to make a decision about a product launch. How likely
would you be to share your opinion first?”, and “You and the person
you just wrote about are responsible for deciding on the agenda of your
next department meeting. How likely would you be to share your ideas
for the agenda first?” In all three scenarios, participants reported their
tendency to move first on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all
likely) to 7 (very likely).
3.4.1.5. Objectification
Participants assigned to complete the objectification measure rated
the extent to which they objectified the work partner they described.
We used the established ten-item objectification scale previously used
by Gruenfeld and colleagues (Sample 1: α= .67; Sample 2: α= .69).
Example items include: “I think more about what this person can do for
me than what I can do for him/her”, “I tend to contact this person when
I need something from him/her” and “This relationship is important to
me because it helps me accomplish my goals.” The items were measured
on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree).
3.4.1.6. Sense of power
Next, participants were asked to think back to the relationship they
described and indicated how powerful they felt in this relationship. We
used the sense of power scale developed by Anderson, John, and
Keltner (2012; Sample 1: α= .91; Sample 2: α= .92). Example items
include: “In the relationship with this person, I can get him/her to do
what I want”, “In the relationship with this person, I think I have a great
deal of power” and “In the relationship with this person, I can get him/
her to listen to what I say.” Participants responded using a 7-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Finally, participants provided their demographic information and
were debriefed.
3.4.2. Results
3.4.2.1. Manipulation check
The power manipulation was successful. Participants in the high-
power condition reported feeling more powerful (Sample 1: M=5.75,
SD=1.06; Sample 2: M=5.31, SD=1.22) than participants in the
control condition (Sample 1: M=5.08, SD=0.81, t(1, 897)= 7.46,
p < .001, d= .71; Sample 2: M=5.03, SD=0.98, t(1, 897)= 2.81,
p= .005, d= .25). Participants in the low-power condition reported
feeling less powerful (Sample 1: M=4.33, SD=1.37; Sample 2:
M=4.20, SD=1.38) than participants in the control condition
(Sample 1: t(1, 897)=−8.31, p < .001, d=−.67; Sample 2: t(1,
897)=−8.45, p < .001, d=−.70), and participants in the high-
power condition (Sample 1: t(1, 897)=−15.58, p < .001,
d=−1.16; Sample 2: t(1, 897)=−11.18, p < .001, d=−.85).
3.4.2.2. Action orientation
Consistent with past research, we found that participants in the
high-power condition were more inclined to assert themselves first in
an interaction than participants in the control and low-power condi-
tions. Participants in the high-power condition were more likely to
speak first in an interaction (Sample 1: M=5.74, SD=1.10; Sample 2:
M=5.43, SD=1.24) than participants in the control condition
(Sample 1: M=5.25, SD=1.01, t(1, 447)= 3.47, p= .001, d= .46;
Sample 2; M=5.13, SD=1.25, t(1, 449)= 1.99, p= .047, d= .24),
and participants in the low-power condition (Sample 1: M=4.24,
SD=1.53, t(1, 447)= 10.57, p < .001, d=1.12; Sample 2:
M=4.50, SD=1.43, t(1, 449)= 6.12, p < .001, d= .70).
Importantly, providing support for the hypothesized linear effect of
social power on action orientation, participants in the low-power con-
dition were less likely to assert themselves first than participants in the
control condition (Sample 1: t(1, 447)=−7.08, p < .001, d=−.78;
Sample 2: t(1, 449)=−4.26, p < .001, d=−.48). See Fig. 4.
3.4.2.3. Objectification
Based on past research, we expected that participants in the high-
power condition would exhibit a higher tendency to objectify their
interaction partner than those in the control condition. This is what we
found. Participants in the high-power condition were more likely to
objectify their work partner (Sample 1: M=4.54, SD= .77; Sample 2:
M=4.43, SD= .86) than participants in the control condition (Sample
1: M=3.93, SD= .93, t(1, 447)= 6.43, p < .001, d= .71; Sample 2:
M=3.81, SD= .98, t(1, 445)= 6.20, p < .001, d= .67). However,
departing from prior research and in line with our argument that high
and low power can lead to similar effects, participants in the low-power
condition were also more likely to objectify their work partner (Sample
1: M=4.43, SD= .78; Sample 2: M=4.55, SD= .74) than partici-
pants in the control condition (Sample 1: t(1, 447)= 5.16, p < .001,
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d= .58; Sample 2: t(1, 445)= 7.34, p < .001, d= .85). The difference
in objectification between participants in the low- and high-power
conditions was not significant (Sample 1: t(1, 447)=−1.16, p= .25,
d=−.14; Sample 2: t(1, 445)= 1.17, p= .24, d= .15), suggesting
that high- and low-power participants indeed exhibited similar ten-
dencies (see Fig. 4).7
3.4.3. Discussion
The current study is a first empirical demonstration of the idea that
although low power sometimes leads to opposite effects relative to high
power, at other times both high and low power lead to similar ten-
dencies. In line with the idea that high- and low-power individuals
differ in the amount of agency they enjoy, power led to a linear effect
for action orientation (i.e., speaking first in a social setting).
Conversely, we found that power had a curvilinear effect on an in-
strumental tendency (i.e., objectifying another social actor). These
findings provide support for our theoretical model, which suggests that
because instrumental goals are more salient in unequal-power re-
lationships due to heightened self-interest in those relationships, and
because objectification involves appraising others in terms of their in-
strumental value, both high- and low-power individuals are likely to
objectify their relational counterpart more than individuals in situa-
tions of equal power. This implies that unequal-power relationships
give rise to their own unique psychological experiences and behaviors,
which can fundamentally differ from experiences and behaviors ob-
served in equal-power relationships. It also supports the idea that low
power is not necessarily a linear extension of high power and that
theories building on such linearity assumptions may need refinement.
4. Implications for future research
Our quantitative review of past social power research shows that the
literature has been preoccupied with the effects of high power and has,
consequentially, assumed that low-power effects follow linearly from
high power. The present work challenges this assumption and, instead,
proposes that low power should be thought of as a state that can have
its own independent effects. To aid power scholars in developing and
refining their hypotheses, we have conceptualized low power in
                Sample 1 (MTurk)                Sample 2 (Prolific; pre-registered) 
Fig. 4. Power led to a linear effect on action orientation (top panels) and a curvilinear effect on objectification (bottom panels). Error bars indicate± 1 SEs.
7We replicated the effect of power on objectification using a non-overlapping
MTurk sample in which we did not measure action orientation (n=259).
Participants in the high power condition were more likely to objectify their
work partner (M=4.49, SD= .86) than participants in the control condition
(M=3.86, SD= .88), t(1, 258)= 5.01, p < .001, d= .72. Further, replicating
our findings, participants in the low power condition were also more likely to
objectify their work partner (M=4.47, SD= .70) than participants in the
control condition, t(1, 258)= 4.87, p < .001, d= .76. There was no difference
in objectification between participants in the low- and high power conditions, t
(1, 258)=−.15, p= .88, d=−.03.
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relation to high power by not only highlighting the differences between
the two constructs, but also their similarities. Although there may be
many ways to think about the effects of high and low power, our dis-
tinction between unequal- and equal-power relationships provides un-
ique insights into the psychology of low power and the circumstances
under which low power may not linearly follow from high power. Our
experiments emphasize the benefits of systematically considering the
consequences of low power and, in so doing, extends research on action
orientation and objectification.
4.1. Systematically studying low power
If one accepts the notion that low- and high-power individuals share
common experiences, we are faced with the challenge of adapting our
theory development and testing to account for this possibility. To ad-
dress the challenges associated with such curvilinear effects, related
literatures are informative. For example, the status literature has long
recognized the importance of thinking about hierarchical variables not
merely in terms of “high” and “low,” but rather in terms of a continuum
that can take the form of a non-linear shape. For example, sociologists
advanced the notion of middle-status conformity to reflect the idea that
both high- and low-status actors conform less than those with moderate
levels of status (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001). More recently, Duguid
and Goncalo (2015) observed similar patterns for creativity such that
both high- and low-status individuals are more likely to advance crea-
tive solutions than those in the middle.
We believe a similar approach may be fruitful in advancing social
power research. We would like to highlight two notable examples that
have started to disentangle the effects of low from high power in more
systematic ways and have thus taken a step in what we believe to be a
fruitful direction. In their “Middle-Power Theory,” Anicich and Hirsh
(2017) proposed an update to the widely-cited approach-inhibition
theory (Keltner et al., 2003) by discussing the psychological experience
of middle power. According to this theory, individuals in middle-power
positions – relative to those in high- and low-power positions – engage
in frequent vertical code-switching (alternating interactions with high-
and low-power partners) that can result in heightened role conflict and
anxiety. Anicich and Hirsh (2017) recognized that power may lead to
non-linear patterns and independently considered the consequences of
three different levels of power (high, middle, and low power) to refine
past theorizing that has merely relied on two levels of power, pre-
sumably representing polar opposites. In addition, some scholars have
started using 3-cell study designs to resolve theoretical ambiguities that
have emerged from the use of 2-cell designs (Schmid Mast et al., 2009).
For example, inconsistencies in the effect of power on perspective-
taking were speculated to be a consequence of the lack of a low-power
condition (for a more detailed discussion see Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, &
Gruenfeld, 2006; Schmid Mast et al., 2009). This issue was recently
addressed in a study including a high-power, control, and low-power
condition (Blader, Shirako, & Chen, 2016), which confirmed Galinsky
et al.’s (2006) original finding that high-power states (relative to con-
trol and low-power states) decreased perspective-taking.
4.2. Need for more nuanced study designs
4.2.1. Testing the entire spectrum of power
To test more precise theories of power, more nuanced study designs
are needed. Study designs often follow theories and so one implication
for theory testing is to empirically account for the notion that the effects
of power may be more complex. One way to effectively test whether the
effects of power follow a linear pattern, a U-shaped pattern, or another
pattern is to use manipulations of power that allow for a more fine-
grained differentiation between high and low levels of power. For ex-
ample, Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, and De Dreu (2008)
manipulated power by varying the delta in an ultimatum game where
the offer sender makes an initial offer that can then be accepted or
rejected by the offer recipient. The delta is an exogenously determined
discount factor (0≤ δ≤1) that is used to calculate the final payoff of
the players involved in an ultimatum game. In case the proposal of the
offer sender is rejected by the offer recipient, the offer is multiplied by
the delta. The appealing feature of this manipulation is that it covers
the entire spectrum from absolute power (δ= 1.00) to high power (e.g.
δ= .90) to low power (e.g. δ= .10) to no power (δ=0). There are
other power manipulations that can achieve the same goal. For ex-
ample, varying decision weights in groups as a percentage (Sachdev &
Bourhis, 1985), varying the numeric value or quantity of negotiation
alternatives (Schaerer, Loschelder, & Swaab, 2016; Schaerer, Swaab, &
Galinsky, 2015), or changing the payoff structure in matrix games
(Tjosvold & Sagaria, 1978) allow differentiation between smaller in-
tervals of power.
Another direction for future research is to systematically consider
the boundary areas of the power spectrum. For example, there is reason
to believe that having low power versus no power can be associated
with qualitatively different psychological experiences. Handgraaf et al.
(2008) argued that “if even the smallest decrease in power means one of
the parties becomes completely dependent on another, this may have
strong effects on the way the situation is interpreted […]” (p.1146).
Similar observations have been made in negotiations. Schaerer et al.
(2015) found that although negotiators without any alternatives (no
power) felt less powerful than those with weak alternatives (low
power), those with no power surprisingly achieved better outcomes
than those with some power and at times negotiated as aggressively as
those with high power. Systematically examining differences of abso-
lute power relative to high power and low power relative to no power
may prove fruitful in better understanding the consequences of social
power more broadly.
4.2.2. Mastering the tradeoff between design specificity and statistical
validity
Although the present research implies that 3-cell designs allow for a
more rigorous test of a causal relationship and the underlying causal
force, researchers may still find ways to draw valid conclusions when
using 2-cell designs. One obvious approach to increasing the level of
confidence in whether high and/or low power drive an effect, is to
complement studies with two cells with at least one study with a 3-cell
design. Another approach is to compare subjective and objective out-
come measures. For example, Duguid and Goncalo (2012) examined
whether the experience of power influences individuals’ perception of
their own height. Because study participants’ estimates of their own
height could be objectively compared to participants’ actual height, the
study was not only able to conclude that height estimates were higher
for high-power participants than for low-power participants, but also
that it was only in the high-power condition where participants’ esti-
mates deviated from their objective height.
There are also other ways to deal with the lack of a 3-cell design, for
example, by including process measures, testing boundary conditions,
and successively addressing alternative explanations in a series of stu-
dies (Shadish et al., 2002). At the very least, scholars should disclose
when their study designs do not allow for definitive conclusions about a
certain aspect of power. For example, although one study compared
high power to a control condition, the authors explicitly noted that “our
theoretical focus is on the influence of powerfulness and moral identity,
and so we manipulated a neutral control condition rather than low
power or powerlessness in our experiments. It could prove interesting
to develop and test theory related to how a perceived lack of power
might interact with moral identity” (DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, &
Ceranic, 2012, p. 687). Failing to explicate such limitations may pre-
vent other researchers from investigating low power or cause lay people
to make premature judgments about the consequences of lacking
power.
We also appreciate that due to the ever-increasing need for larger
sample sizes researchers may need to be more focused and economical
M. Schaerer et al. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 149 (2018) 73–96
84
when designing studies and that 2-cell study designs may be a con-
sequence of that. In practice, decisions about the number of experi-
mental conditions and number of observations per cell are often in-
terrelated and at times can be a tradeoff. Increasing the number of cells
may come at the cost of smaller cell sizes. Nevertheless, we believe that
both dimensions are important to conduct more rigorous research; in-
creasing cell size provides more confidence in statistical conclusions and
increasing the number of cells strengthens theoretical conclusions. With
the emergence of affordable and innovative ways to collect data, such
as large online panels (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) and
crowdsourced research (Schweinsberg et al., 2016; Silberzahn &
Uhlmann, 2015), such tradeoffs may become less of a challenge in the
future.
4.3. What is the baseline of power? How to select control conditions
We have proposed that to better understand the consequences of
power, including low power into theorizing and study designs is a ne-
cessary step. Yet, the accuracy with which causal inferences can be
drawn from studying either high or low power also depends on what
they are compared to. Control conditions provide a meaningful baseline
against which the effect of a treatment condition (e.g., high power, low
power) can be compared to. Generally, control conditions are identical
to treatment conditions except that the independent variable is absent
(Shadish et al., 2002). The presence of a control condition is important
(a) to assess whether there is an effect of the independent variable at all
and (b) to interpret the directionality of a treatment effect (Bailey,
2008; Mullen & Monin, 2016).
Despite the advantages of including a control condition in an ex-
perimental design, only about a third (35.6%) of studies in our quan-
titative review included such a condition. This is striking given that
there are many different types of control conditions readily available to
researchers. In the following, we briefly review the advantages and
disadvantages of the different types of control conditions and discuss
factors that may make one type preferable over another.
4.3.1. A typology of control conditions
Control conditions used to study power can be broadly categorized
into four classes: no treatment, power-unrelated treatment, relational
control, and middle-power (see Table 2 for an overview). Each type of
control condition has its own advantages and disadvantages, although
some types seem generally preferable to others. In “no treatment” con-
trol conditions, participants are not exposed to any treatment. For ex-
ample, Lammers et al. (2013) instructed participants to either write
about an experience in which they had power over someone (high-
power condition) or where someone had power over them (low-power
condition). Participants in the control condition did not receive any
instructions and directly proceeded to the task. Although this type of
control condition accounts for participants’ baseline levels of power, it
does not control for other experimental characteristics that may vary
between a power condition and a no-treatment condition, such as study
duration, social interaction, or power salience.
In power-unrelated control conditions, participants usually complete
a neutral task that is similar to the power manipulation. For instance,
instead of being exposed to power-related words in a sentence-com-
pletion task, participants are confronted with power-unrelated words
(Smith & Trope, 2006). Similarly, instead of being instructed to recall
an episode of high or low power, control participants may be instructed
to describe a power-unrelated event, such as a trip to the grocery store
or what happened on the previous day (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2006;
Overbeck & Droutman, 2013). Although this type of control condition
accounts for experimental characteristics (e.g., amount of time spent on
study, cognitive effort), it also shares many of the downsides of no-
treatment control conditions.
Some of the shortcomings of no-treatment and power-unrelated
control conditions can be mitigated by using more conservative control
conditions. A relational control condition considers the mutual depen-
dence between individuals that is inherent in many power manipula-
tions. For instance, writing about someone who has more or less power
almost always involves reflecting on a relationship with another person.
Such cognitions may be controlled for by writing about someone who
has an equal amount of power. For example, Inesi et al. (2012) either
instructed participants to write about their subordinate (high-power
condition) or a peer (control condition). Similarly, Kunstman,
Fitzpatrick, and Smith (2018) led participants to believe their (ficti-
tious) interaction partner controlled the distribution of rewards (high-
power condition), that they themselves controlled the distribution of
rewards (low-power condition), or that they would jointly determine
reward allocation with their interaction partner (equal power). The
advantage of such control conditions is that they not only control for
differences in experimental characteristics, but also for inter-
dependence and social interaction.
A final type of control condition that has only recently gained traction
is one in whichmiddle power is manipulated. Middle power involves a state
in which an individual’s power “is neither consistently higher nor lower
than the power of others” (Anicich & Hirsh, 2017, p. 7). For example, to
manipulate middle power Duguid and Goncalo (2015) instructed partici-
pants to recall a situation in which they were part of a group and their
power relative to the other group members was “…neither at the top or
bottom of the power hierarchy.” Like relational controls, middle power
considers experimental characteristics and other interdependencies acti-
vated by high- and low-power manipulations. Although we believe that
using relational and middle-power control conditions generally creates a
more conservative test of a power effect, selecting an appropriate control
condition also depends on contextual factors.
4.3.2. Factors affecting control condition choice
Our discussion suggests that although there are considerable dif-
ferences between the four types of control conditions, they all have
certain advantages and disadvantages. Whether a particular control
condition is feasible depends on a variety of factors such as the research
question, manipulation type, and study context. When it comes to
multifaceted constructs such as social power, research questions can vary
widely and the focus of a study may dictate which control condition is
best. For example, if the goal is to understand how a generalized feeling
of power, or a “power mindset,” (e.g., Anderson & Galinsky, 2006;
Inesi, 2010) influences an outcome, using a relational or middle-power
control condition may not be appropriate as they will not elicit a power-
neutral mindset. Rather, a power-neutral or power-unrelated condition
may be a better choice since power salience will be lower in such
conditions. In contrast, if a study aims to examine the effects of power
on, for example social distance, using a relational control condition as
baseline may be more feasible (for details see Magee & Smith, 2013).
Certain power manipulations also do not naturally lend themselves to
all types of control conditions. For example, power manipulations invol-
ving making a fist (e.g., Schubert & Koole, 2009) would make it challen-
ging to implement a relational control condition. Using a power-unrelated
control condition (i.e., a neutral hand gesture) or providing no instructions
may be the only available options. In contrast, the popular recall proce-
dure (Galinsky et al., 2003) asking participants to recall an episode of high
or low power provides more options, such as omitting the recall procedure
altogether (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2008), asking participants to recall a
power-unrelated event (e.g., their last meal; Kraus et al., 2011), asking
participants to recall an equal-power relationship (e.g., Inesi et al., 2012),
or asking participants to recall an episode where they had a moderate
amount of power (e.g., Duguid & Goncalo, 2015).
In deciding whether a control condition is feasible, researchers should
also take the context in which a study is conducted into consideration. For
example, although Galinsky and colleagues initially used a control prime
asking participants to write about their previous day (Galinsky et al.,
2003), they later replaced it with a prime asking participants to recall their
last trip to the supermarket (e.g., Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2015)
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because the former can be subject to unwanted contextual influences (e.g.,
the weather the day before, anxiety produced by a final exam, or the loss
of the local college basketball team on the previous day). In addition,
characteristics of the participant pool may also influence which control
condition is preferable. For instance, if a sample consists of individuals
from a group that is naturally low in power (e.g., unemployed people,
minorities), then a no-treatment control condition may reflect a low-power
condition. In such a case, using a scenario-based manipulation of equal or
middle power may be preferable.
4.3.3. Alleviating concerns over the ideal control condition
One way to alleviate concerns over selecting the ideal control con-
dition may be to conduct conceptual replications using different power
manipulations across a series of studies. The advantage of this approach
is that each manipulation tends to come with its own “ideal” control
condition that can account for certain alternative explanations.
However, such an approach may not be effective if different confounds
emerge in different studies. Further, conceptual replications may come
at the expense of direct replications (Simons, 2014). Two more fruitful
ways to address potential shortcomings of control conditions are con-
trol-by-design and statistical control.
Control-by-design involves adding design elements (e.g., pre-tests,
additional control groups) that prevent confounding (Becker, 2005;
Shadish et al., 2002). For example, to better disentangle the effects of
power from potentially unwanted factors one could include multiple
control conditions in the same study. In their research on the effects of
power on impression formation, Stevens and Fiske (2000) compared the
effects of power (i.e., asymmetric dependence) to both a symmetric
dependence condition and a neutral control condition. The second op-
tion is statistical control, which involves measurement of third variables
and including them as covariates during the analysis stage (Shadish
et al., 2002). This is important as related constructs such as mood and
self-esteem can potentially produce effects similar to those observed in
the power literature, such as taking initiative, speaking up, and goal
pursuit (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). To rule out that
mood (instead of the hypothesized illusory control) was driving the
effects of power on approach-related tendencies, Fast, Gruenfeld,
Sivanathan, and Galinsky (2009) showed that their predictions re-
mained robust when controlling for mood.
In sum, although there are a variety of options available to create a
meaningful baseline for high and low power, we believe that relational
and middle-power conditions generally provide a more conservative
test of a power effect. Unfortunately, experimental and contextual
characteristics can limit control condition choice. In these cases, con-
trol-by-design and statistical control can help alleviate concerns over
other factors that may contribute to an effect.
4.4. Limitations & future directions
We would like to highlight several limitations of our work that give
rise to fruitful avenues for future research. First, although we arrived at the
conclusion that past power research has overemphasized high power re-
lative to low power by triangulating different types of analyses, it is pos-
sible that some of these results may be partially driven by linguistic
choices. For example, although a study might conclude that “powerfulness
leads to cheating” the true intention may have been to conclude that
“high-power individuals exhibited higher levels of cheating relative to low-
power individuals.” An attentive reader may be able to discern the subtle,
but important, difference between these two statements. Nevertheless, we
would err on the side of caution as even subtle linguistic idiosyncrasies in
published research can have profound scientific and societal implications,
such as exaggerated or incorrect interpretations by non-expert audiences,
misguided public decision-making, and ineffective organizational inter-
ventions (Adams et al., 2017; Ecker, Lewandowsky, Chang, & Pillai, 2014;
Rich & Zaragoza, 2016). Future research could test more systematically
how experts and lay people differentially predict and interpret the effects
of high and low power.
Second, one could argue that the emphasis on powerfulness in social
Table 2
A typology of control conditions.
Type Examples Strengths and weaknesses
Controls for… Does not control for…
No treatment ▪ Power manipulation omitted in control condition
(Kipnis, 1972; Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2013, Study 1)
▪ Baseline state ▪ Experimental characteristics (e.g., study
duration, social interaction)
▪ Other constructs activated by power
manipulation (e.g., inter-dependence, mood,
status etc.)
▪ Power salience
Power-unrelated
treatment
▪ Exposure to power-neutral words (Smith & Trope,
2006, Study 2; Wade-Benzoni, Hernandez, Medvec, &
Messick, 2008, Study 3)
▪ Recalling one’s previous day (Galinsky et al., 2006,
Study 3)
▪ Experimental characteristics (e.g., study
duration, social interaction)
▪ Baseline state
▪ Constructs manipulated in control condition
(e.g., yesterday’s basketball game)
▪ Other constructs activated by power
manipulation (e.g., inter-dependence, mood,
status etc.)
▪ Power salience
Relational control ▪ Recalling an equal-power relationship (Inesi et al.,
2012, Study 2)
▪ Symmetric interdependence (Stevens & Fiske, 2009,
Study 1; Kunstman et al., 2018, Study 1)
▪ Experimental characteristics (e.g., study
duration, social interaction)
▪ Power salience (depending on
operationalization)a
▪ Interdependence
▪ Social interaction
▪ Baseline state
▪ Other constructs activated by power
manipulation (e.g., mood, status)
▪ Power salience (depending on
operationalization)a
Middle power ▪ Recalling a middle-power situation (Duguid &
Goncalo, 2015, Study 4)
▪ Vertical code switching (Anicich & Hirsh, 2017)
▪ Experimental characteristics (e.g., study
duration, social interaction)
▪ Power salience
▪ Interdependence
▪ Social interaction
▪ Baseline state
▪ Other constructs activated by power
manipulation (e.g., mood, status)
a Whether a relational control condition controls for power salience depends on its operationalization. For example, a control condition instructing participants to
“recall an interaction with a friend [or peer]” does not control for power salience whereas instructing participants to “recall a relationship where both parties had
equal power over each other” controls for power salience.
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power research is less problematic than implied by the current research.
After all, situations of low power are abundant and it may be reasonable
to assume that they are the modal situation in life. If this were the case,
then one could argue that most of the research outside the power lit-
erature investigates behavior under conditions of low power and that
we in fact know a lot about its consequences. We agree that studying
people high in power is not an issue in and of itself and we have
highlighted several reasons for why doing so is important and worth-
while. Nevertheless, studying powerfulness may become problematic in
the context of the wide-spread linearity assumptions that currently
underlie the most widely-cited theories of social power. Our framework
suggests that low power should not be treated as the opposite of high
power by default and our study on power and objectification illustrated
this point. In addition, although we argued that situations of low power
are more widespread than situations of high power, we do not mean to
imply that either of those two states are dominating in all situations. In
fact, a recent study by Smith and Hofmann (2016) found that neither
high nor low power is the modal situation in life. Of the 2502 everyday
interactions observed in an experience-sampling study, only 23.7%
were power-related (of which 42.2% were high-power-related and
57.8% were low-power-related) while the remaining 76.3% interac-
tions did not involve any power differences. Thus, while we would
encourage more research in this domain, we feel confident to conclude
that (a) low power is important to understand and that (b) existing
power research provides a limited picture of its consequences.
Third, we would like to highlight that we limited the scope of our
quantitative review to experiments. We made this choice because the
social power literature is dominated by experimental research
(Schaerer et al., 2018; Sturm & Antonakis, 2015) and the present re-
search is primarily concerned with causal inferences regarding the
consequences of low power. Beyond experimental research, some stu-
dies have used an individual-differences approach and measured power
as a trait (e.g., Anderson et al., 2012). Although continuous scales have
the potential to give insight into the exact shape of the relationship
between two variables (Grant & Schwartz, 2011), we are not aware of
any correlational power studies that have explicitly tested or discussed
the possibility of non-linear relationships. We encourage future re-
search to do so. In addition, future research could test whether similar
attribution patterns can be found in correlational research; given the
results of our quantitative literature review, it is possible that correla-
tions between power and other variables may also be attributed to high
power.
Fourth, we noted earlier that we developed our theoretical model
embedded in the context of organizational relationships, such as those
between a supervisor and subordinate, between a buyer and a supplier,
or between peers. We believe the notion of self-interest as a primary
motive of entering and remaining in an unequal-power relationship
(Coleman, 1994) is particularly meaningful in this context. However,
there may also be other social relations where the motives for entering
and staying in a relationship are not necessarily characterized by self-
interest. For example, a child has little choice in changing the re-
lationship with its parents and an army soldier may not have any dis-
cretion in freely forming a hierarchical relationship. Yet, one could
argue that even in those cases, remaining in such relationships may also
be because of self-interest. The child may refrain from running away
due to easy access to food and shelter at home, and the soldier may
abide by the commander to continue to receive an income, because of
fear of being court-marshaled for insubordination, or to advance in
rank. Nevertheless, familial and other non-organizational relationships
may be governed by additional rules (e.g., Clark & Mills, 1979; Fiske,
1992) that could overshadow the psychological experiences our model
predicts. We encourage future research to investigate more system-
atically how contextual differences affect the emergence of self-interest
in asymmetric relationships and its consequences on thought, feelings,
and behavior of the individuals in such relationships.
Finally, while the present research focused on social power, we
believe that the basic theoretical and methodological implications also
apply to other literatures. For example, diversity researchers recently
questioned whether homogeneity is an appropriate comparison group
when studying the effects of diversity. They documented that – similar
to power – outcomes are often interpreted as the effect of diversity
alone despite the fact that homogeneity can have its own independent
effects (Apfelbaum, Phillips, & Richeson, 2014). In a similar vein,
Mullen and Monin (2016) noted that the widespread use of 2-cell de-
signs in moral licensing research have created challenges in building a
cumulative literature. Similar issues may also arise in other fields where
treatment conditions are interchangeably compared to other treatment
or control conditions, such as regulatory focus (Higgins, 1998), emo-
tions (Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012), and accountability (Lerner &
Tetlock, 1999).
5. Conclusion
While there are good reasons to study the consequences of experi-
encing high power, our quantitative review suggests that we have a
limited understanding of low power. We have laid out arguments to
suggest that focusing on low-power individuals is a necessary step in
understanding social power more deeply and have presented a frame-
work that puts low power in relation to high power. We believe this
framework can help scholars anticipate whether and when low power
does or does not follow from high power, and we hope to stimulate a
more systematic study of low-power individuals. Although high and
low power semantically represent opposites of the same construct, the
present research suggests that high- and low-power individuals may in
fact share a similar psychology.
Appendix A. List of journals considered
Note: Within each discipline, journals are ranked according to the number of articles in our sample in a decreasing way (from more to fewer studies).
Psychology
• Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (number of studies in sample: 91)• Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (84)• Psychological Science (55)• Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (35)• Social Psychological and Personality Science (16)• European Journal of Social Psychology (14)• British Journal of Social Psychology (8)
Organizational Behavior
• Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (35)• Academy of Management Journal (8)
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• Administrative Science Quarterly (8)• Journal of Applied Psychology (7)• Organization Science (3)• Journal of Organizational Behavior (1)• Journal of Management (0)• Management Science (0)• Research in Organizational Behavior (0)
Marketing
• Journal of Consumer Research (31)• Journal of Consumer Psychology (3)• Journal of Marketing Research (0)
Appendix B. List of studies included in sample
Authors Year Journal Study Conditions
High power Control Low power
Anderson & Berdahl 2002 JPSP 1 • •
Anderson & Berdahl 2002 JPSP 2 • •
Anderson & Galinsky 2006 EJSP 2 • •
Anderson & Galinsky 2006 EJSP 3 • • •
Anderson & Galinsky 2006 EJSP 4 • •
Anderson & Thompson 2004 OBHDP 1 • •
Anderson & Thompson 2004 OBHDP 2 • •
Anicich, Fast, Halevy, & Galinsky 2016 OS 2a • •
Anicich, Fast, Halevy, & Galinsky 2016 OS 2b • •
Anicich, Fast, Halevy, & Galinsky 2016 OS 3 • •
Berdahl & Martorana 2006 EJSP 1 • •
Bian, Haque, & Smith 2012 BJSP 1 • •
Bian, Haque, & Smith 2012 BJSP 2 • •
Bian, Haque, & Smith 2012 BJSP 3 • •
Blader & Chen 2012 JPSP 1 • •
Blader & Chen 2012 JPSP 2 • •
Blader & Chen 2012 JPSP 3 • •
Blader & Chen 2012 JPSP 4 • •
Blader & Chen 2012 JPSP 5 • •
Bohns & Wiltermuth 2012 JESP 1 • • •
Bohns & Wiltermuth 2012 JESP 2 • •
Brescoll 2011 ASQ 2 • •
Brinol, Petty, Valle, & Rucker 2007 JPSP 1 • •
Brinol, Petty, Valle, & Rucker 2007 JPSP 2 • •
Brinol, Petty, Valle, & Rucker 2007 JPSP 3 • •
Brinol, Petty, Valle, & Rucker 2007 JPSP 4 • •
Brinol, Petty, Valle, & Rucker 2007 JPSP 5 • •
Brion & Anderson 2013 OBHDP 2 • • •
Burgmer & Englich 2013 SPPS 1 • •
Burgmer & Englich 2013 SPPS 2 • •
Carney, Cuddy, & Yap 2010 PS 1 • •
Caza, Tiedens, & Lee 2011 OBHDP 1 • •
Caza, Tiedens, & Lee 2011 OBHDP 2 • •
Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh 2002 JPSP 1 • •
Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh 2002 JPSP 2 • • •
Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh 2002 JPSP 3 • •
Chen, Langer, & Mendoza-Denton 2009 JPSP 1 • •
Chen, Langer, & Mendoza-Denton 2009 JPSP 2 • •
Chen, Langer, & Mendoza-Denton 2009 JPSP 3 • •
Chen, Langer, & Mendoza-Denton 2009 JPSP 4 • •
Cho & Fast 2012 JESP 1 • •
Copeland 1994 JPSP 1 • •
Cuddy, Wilmuth, Yap, & Carney 2015 JAP 1 • •
De Cremer & Van Dijk 2005 EJSP 1 • •
De Dreu & Van Kleef 2004 JESP 1 • •
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De Dreu & Van Kleef 2004 JESP 3 • •
de Lemus, Spears, & Moya 2012 PSPB 2 • •
DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic 2012 JAP 1 • •
DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic 2012 JAP 2 • •
Depret & Fiske 1999 JESP 1 • •
DeWall, Baumeister, Mead, & Vohs 2011 JPSP 1a • • •
DeWall, Baumeister, Mead, & Vohs 2011 JPSP 1b • • •
DeWall, Baumeister, Mead, & Vohs 2011 JPSP 2 • • •
DeWall, Baumeister, Mead, & Vohs 2011 JPSP 3 • •
DeWall, Baumeister, Mead, & Vohs 2011 JPSP 4 • •
DeWall, Baumeister, Mead, & Vohs 2011 JPSP 5 • • •
Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky 2015 JPSP 5 • • •
Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky 2015 JPSP 6 • •
Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky 2010 SPPS 1 • • •
Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky 2010 SPPS 2 • •
Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky 2010 SPPS 3 • •
Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky 2010 SPPS 4 • •
Duguid & Goncalo 2012 PS 1 • • •
Duguid & Goncalo 2012 PS 2 • •
Duguid & Goncalo 2012 PS 3 • •
Earle, Giuliano, & Archer 1983 PSPB 1 • •
Eastwick, Wilkey, Finkel, et al. 2013 JESP 1 • •
Fast & Chen 2009 PS 2 • •
Fast & Chen 2009 PS 3 • •
Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky 2009 PS 1 • • •
Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky 2009 PS 2 • •
Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky 2009 PS 3 • •
Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky 2009 PS 4 • •
Fast, Halevy, & Galinsky 2012 JESP 1 • •
Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, & Galinsky 2012 OBHDP 1 • •
Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, & Galinsky 2012 OBHDP 2 • • •
Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, & Galinsky 2012 OBHDP 3 • • •
Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, & Galinsky 2012 OBHDP 5 • •
Ferguson, Ormiston, & Moon 2010 JAP 1 • • •
Fisher, Grégoire, & Murray 2011 JCP 1 • •
Fisher, Grégoire, & Murray 2011 JCP 2 • •
Fisher, Grégoire, & Murray 2011 JCP 3 • •
Fischer, Fischer, Englich, Aydin, & Frey 2011 JESP 1 • •
Fischer, Fischer, Englich, Aydin, & Frey 2011 JESP 2 • •
Fischer, Fischer, Englich, Aydin, & Frey 2011 JESP 3 • •
Fischer, Fischer, Englich, Aydin, & Frey 2011 JESP 4 • •
Fragale 2006 OBHDP 1 • •
Fragale 2006 OBHDP 2 • •
Fragale, Overbeck, & Neale 2011 JESP 2 • •
Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee 2003 JPSP 1 • •
Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee 2003 JPSP 2 • •
Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee 2003 JPSP 3 • • •
Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, et al. 2008 JPSP 1 • •
Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, et al. 2008 JPSP 2 • •
Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, et al. 2008 JPSP 3 • • •
Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, et al. 2008 JPSP 4 • •
Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, et al. 2008 JPSP 5 • • •
Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld 2006 PS 1 • •
Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld 2006 PS 2a • •
Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld 2006 PS 2b • •
Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld 2006 PS 3 • •
Galinsky, Magee, Rus, Rothman, & Todd 2014 SPPS 1 • •
Galinsky, Magee, Rus, Rothman, & Todd 2014 SPPS 2 • •
Galinsky, Magee, Rus, Rothman, & Todd 2014 SPPS 3 • •
Galinsky, Wang, Whitson, et al. 2013 PS 1 • •
Garbinsky, Klesse, & Aaker 2014 JCR 1 • • •
Garbinsky, Klesse, & Aaker 2014 JCR 2 • •
Garbinsky, Klesse, & Aaker 2014 JCR 3 • •
Garbinsky, Klesse, & Aaker 2014 JCR 4 • •
Garbinsky, Klesse, & Aaker 2014 JCR 5 • •
Georgesen & Harris 2006 EJSP 1 • •
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Giner-Sorolla & Maitner 2013 PSPB 1 • •
Glasford & Pratto 2015 EJSP 1 • •
Glasford & Pratto 2015 EJSP 2 • •
Goldstein & Hays 2011 ASQ 1 • •
Goldstein & Hays 2011 ASQ 2 • • •
Goldstein & Hays 2011 ASQ 3 • • •
Gordon & Chen 2013 PSPB 1 • •
Gordon & Chen 2013 PSPB 4 • •
Greer & van Kleef 2010 JAP 2 • •
Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky 2008 JPSP 1a • •
Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky 2008 JPSP 1b • •
Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky 2008 JPSP 2 • •
Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky 2008 JPSP 3 • •
Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky 2008 JPSP 4 • •
Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky 2008 JPSP 5 • •
Guinote 2008 JPSP 1 • •
Guinote 2008 JPSP 2 • •
Guinote 2008 JPSP 4 • •
Guinote 2008 JPSP 5 • •
Guinote 2008 JPSP 6 • •
Guinote 2007a JESP 1 • •
Guinote 2007a JESP 2 • •
Guinote 2007a JESP 3 • •
Guinote 2007b PSPB 1 • •
Guinote 2007b PSPB 2 • •
Guinote 2007b PSPB 3 • •
Guinote 2007b PSPB 4 • •
Guinote 2007c JESP 1 • •
Guinote 2007c JESP 2 • •
Guinote, Weick, & Cai 2012 PS 1 • •
Guinote, Weick, & Cai 2012 PS 2 • •
Guinote, Weick, & Cai 2012 PS 3 • •
Guinote, Willis, & Martellotta 2010 JESP 1 • •
Guinote, Willis, & Martellotta 2010 JESP 2 • • •
Guinote, Willis, & Martellotta 2010 JESP 3 • •
Gwinn, Judd, & Park 2013 JESP 1 • •
Gwinn, Judd, & Park 2013 JESP 2 • •
Hall, Rosip, LeBeau, Horgan, & Carter 2006 JESP 1 • • •
Hays & Goldstein 2015 JESP 2 • •
Hays & Goldstein 2015 JESP 3 • •
Hays & Goldstein 2015 JESP 4 • •
Hays & Goldstein 2015 JESP 5 • •
Howard, Gardner, & Thompson 2007 JPSP 1 • •
Huang & Galinsky 2011 SPPS 3 • •
Huang, Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Guillory 2011 PS 1 • •
Huang, Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Guillory 2011 PS 2 • •
Huang, Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Guillory 2011 PS 3 • •
Inesi 2010 OBHDP 1 • •
Inesi 2010 OBHDP 2 • • •
Inesi 2010 OBHDP 3 • •
Inesi 2010 OBHDP 4 • •
Inesi, Botti, Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky 2011 PS 1a • •
Inesi, Botti, Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky 2011 PS 1b • •
Inesi, Botti, Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky 2011 PS 3a • •
Inesi, Botti, Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky 2011 PS 3b • •
Inesi, Gruenfeld, & Galinsky 2012 JESP 1 • •
Inesi, Gruenfeld, & Galinsky 2012 JESP 2 • •
Inesi, Gruenfeld, & Galinsky 2012 JESP 3 • •
Inesi, Gruenfeld, & Galinsky 2012 JESP 5 • •
Inesi, Lee, & Rios 2014 JESP 1 • •
Inesi, Lee, & Rios 2014 JESP 2 • •
Inesi, Lee, & Rios 2014 JESP 3 • •
Inesi, Lee, & Rios 2014 JESP 4 • •
Inesi & Rios 2013 JESP 1 • •
Inesi & Rios 2013 JESP 2 • •
Inesi & Rios 2013 JESP 3 • •
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Jiang, Zhan, & Rucker 2014 JCR 1a • •
Jiang, Zhan, & Rucker 2014 JCR 1b • •
Jiang, Zhan, & Rucker 2014 JCR 2 • •
Jiang, Zhan, & Rucker 2014 JCR 3 • •
Jiang, Zhan, & Rucker 2014 JCR 4 • •
Jiang, Zhan, & Rucker 2014 JCR 5 • •
Jin, He, & Zhang 2014 JCR 1 • •
Jin, He, & Zhang 2014 JCR 3 • •
Jin, He, & Zhang 2014 JCR 4 • • •
Johnson & Lammers 2012 JESP 1 • •
Johnson & Lammers 2012 JESP 2 • •
Johnson & Lammers 2012 JESP 3 • • •
Jordan, Sivanathan, & Galinsky 2011 ASQ 1 • •
Jordan, Sivanathan, & Galinsky 2011 ASQ 2 • •
Jordan, Sivanathan, & Galinsky 2011 ASQ 3 • •
Jordan, Sivanathan, & Galinsky 2011 ASQ 5 • •
Joshi & Fast 2013a PSPB 1 • •
Joshi & Fast 2013a PSPB 2 • •
Joshi & Fast 2013a PSPB 3 • • •
Joshi & Fast 2013b PS 1 • •
Joshi & Fast 2013b PS 2 • •
Joshi & Fast 2013b PS 3 • • •
Karremans & Smith 2010 PSPB 2 • •
Kifer, Heller, Perunovic, & Galinsky 2013 PS 2a • •
Kilduff & Galinsky 2013 JPSP 2 • • •
Kim, Smith, & Brigham 1998 PSPB 1 • •
Kipnis 1972 JPSP 1 • •
Koning, Steinel, van Beest, & van Dijk 2011 OBHDP 1 • •
Koning, Steinel, van Beest, & van Dijk 2011 OBHDP 2 • •
Kopelman 2009 OBHDP 1 • •
Kraus, Chen, & Keltner 2011 JESP 3 • • •
Kteily, Saguy, Sidanius, & Taylor 2013 JPSP 2 • •
Kteily, Saguy, Sidanius, & Taylor 2013 JPSP 3 • •
Kteily, Saguy, Sidanius, & Taylor 2013 JPSP 4 • •
Kunstman & Maner 2011 JPSP 1 • •
Kunstman & Maner 2011 JPSP 2 • •
Kunstman & Maner 2011 JPSP 3 • •
Lammers, Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky 2013 JESP 1 • •
Lammers, Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky 2013 JESP 2 • • •
Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten 2008 PS 1 • •
Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten 2008 PS 2 • •
Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten 2008 PS 3 • •
Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten 2008 PS 4 • •
Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten 2012 SPPS 1 • • •
Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten 2012 SPPS 2 • • •
Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten 2012 SPPS 3 • •
Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten 2012 SPPS 4 • • •
Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten 2012 SPPS 5 • • •
Lammers, Gordijn, & Otten 2008 JESP 1 • •
Lammers, Gordijn, & Otten 2008 JESP 2 • •
Lammers, Gordijn, & Otten 2008 JESP 3 • • •
Lammers, Gordijn, & Otten 2008 JESP 4 • •
Lammers & Stapel 2009 JPSP 1 • •
Lammers & Stapel 2009 JPSP 2 • •
Lammers & Stapel 2009 JPSP 3a • •
Lammers & Stapel 2009 JPSP 3b • •
Lammers & Stapel 2009 JPSP 4 • •
Lammers & Stapel 2009 JPSP 5 • •
Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky 2010 PS 1 • •
Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky 2010 PS 2 • •
Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky 2010 PS 3 • •
Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky 2010 PS 4 • •
Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky 2010 PS 5 • •
Lammers, Stoker, & Stapel 2009 PS 1 • •
Lisjak, Molden, & Lee 2012 JPSP 4 • • •
Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld 2007 PSPB 1a • •
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Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld 2007 PSPB 1b • •
Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld 2007 PSPB 2 • •
Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld 2007 PSPB 3 • •
Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld 2007 PSPB 4 • •
Maner, Gailliot, Butz, & Peruche 2007 PSPB 1 • •
Maner, Gailliot, Butz, & Peruche 2007 PSPB 2 • •
Maner, Gailliot, Menzel, & Kunstman 2012 PSPB 1 • •
Maner, Gailliot, Menzel, & Kunstman 2012 PSPB 2 • •
Mason, Zhang, & Dyer 2010 JESP 1 • •
Mason, Zhang, & Dyer 2010 JESP 2 • •
Mason, Zhang, & Dyer 2010 JESP 3 • •
Mead & Maner 2012 JPSP 1 • •
Mead & Maner 2012 JPSP 2 • •
Mead & Maner 2012 JPSP 3 • •
Miyamoto & Ji 2011 PSPB 1 • • •
Miyamoto & Ji 2011 PSPB 2 • •
Moon & Chen 2014 JESP 1 • •
Moon & Chen 2014 JESP 2 • •
Moon & Chen 2014 JESP 3 • •
Moon & Chen 2014 JESP 4 • •
Moon & Chen 2014 JESP 5 • • •
Morand 2000 JOB 1 • •
Mourali & Yang 2013 JCR 1 • •
Mourali & Yang 2013 JCR 2 • •
Mourali & Yang 2013 JCR 3 • •
Mourali & Yang 2013 JCR 4 • •
Narayanan, Tai, & Kinias 2013 OBHDP 1 • • •
Narayanan, Tai, & Kinias 2013 OBHDP 2 • •
Narayanan, Tai, & Kinias 2013 OBHDP 3 • •
Narayanan, Tai, & Kinias 2013 OBHDP 4 • •
Overbeck & Droutman 2013 PS 1 • •
Overbeck & Droutman 2013 PS 2 • •
Overbeck & Droutman 2013 PS 3 • • •
Overbeck, Neale, & Govan 2010 OBHDP 1 • •
Overbeck & Park 2001 JPSP 1 • •
Overbeck & Park 2001 JPSP 2 • •
Overbeck & Park 2001 JPSP 3 • •
Overbeck & Park 2006 OBHDP 2 • •
Park, Streamer, Huang, & Galinsky 2013 JESP 1 • •
Park, Streamer, Huang, & Galinsky 2013 JESP 2a • •
Park, Streamer, Huang, & Galinsky 2013 JESP 2b • •
Park, Streamer, Huang, & Galinsky 2013 JESP 3 • •
Park, Streamer, Huang, & Galinsky 2013 JESP 4 • •
Pitesa & Thau 2013a AMJ 1 • • •
Pitesa & Thau 2013a AMJ 2 • •
Pitesa & Thau 2013a AMJ 3 • •
Pitesa & Thau 2013b JAP 1 • •
Pitesa & Thau 2013b JAP 3 • •
Poppe 2003 EJSP 1 • • •
Ranehill, Dreber, Johannesson, Leiberg, Sul, & Weber 2015 PS 1 • •
Richeson & Ambady 2003 JESP 1 • •
Rodriguez-Bailon, Moya, & Yzerbyt 2000 EJSP 1 • • •
Rucker, Dubois, & Galinsky 2011 JCR 1 • •
Rucker, Dubois, & Galinsky 2011 JCR 2 • • •
Rucker, Dubois, & Galinsky 2011 JCR 3 • •
Rucker, Dubois, & Galinsky 2011 JCR 4 • •
Rucker, Dubois, & Galinsky 2011 JCR 5 • •
Rucker & Galinsky 2009 JESP 2 • • •
Rucker & Galinsky 2009 JESP 3 • •
Rucker & Galinsky 2009 JESP 4 • •
Rucker & Galinsky 2009 JESP 5 • •
Rucker & Galinsky 2008 JCR 1 • • •
Rucker & Galinsky 2008 JCR 2 • • •
Rucker & Galinsky 2008 JCR 3 • •
Rucker, Hu, & Galinsky 2014 JCR 1a • •
Rucker, Hu, & Galinsky 2014 JCR 1b • •
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Rucker, Hu, & Galinsky 2014 JCR 2a • •
Rucker, Hu, & Galinsky 2014 JCR 2b • •
Rucker, Hu, & Galinsky 2014 JCR 3 • •
Rus, van Knippenberg, & Wisse 2010 JESP 1 • •
Schaerer, Swaab, & Galinsky 2015 PS 1a • •
Schaerer, Swaab, & Galinsky 2015 PS 1b • • •
Schaerer, Swaab, & Galinsky 2015 PS 3 • •
Scheepers, de Wit, Ellemers, & Sassenberg 2012 JESP 1 • •
Scheepers, de Wit, Ellemers, & Sassenberg 2012 JESP 2 • •
Scheepers, Ellemers, & Sassenberg 2013 BJSP 1 • •
Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall 2009 JPSP 1 • •
Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall 2009 JPSP 2 • • •
Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall 2009 JPSP 3 • • •
Schmid & Schmid Mast 2013 EJSP 1 • •
Schmid & Schmid Mast 2013 EJSP 2 • •
Scholl & Sassenberg 2015 PSPB 1 • •
Scholl & Sassenberg 2015 PSPB 2 • •
Scholl & Sassenberg 2015 PSPB 3 • •
Scholl & Sassenberg 2014 JESP 2 • •
Scholl & Sassenberg 2014 JESP 3 • •
Scholl & Sassenberg 2014 JESP 4 • • •
Schubert 2004 PSPB 1 • •
Schubert 2004 PSPB 2 • •
Schubert 2004 PSPB 3 • •
Schubert & Koole 2009 JESP 1 • •
Schubert & Koole 2009 JESP 2 • •
See, Morrison, Rothman, & Soll 2011 OBHDP 3 • • •
Slabu & Guinote 2010 JESP 1 • •
Slabu & Guinote 2010 JESP 2 • •
Sligte, de Dreu, & Nijstad 2011 JESP 1 • •
Sligte, de Dreu, & Nijstad 2011 JESP 2 • •
Sligte, de Dreu, & Nijstad 2011 JESP 3 • •
Smith, Dijksterhuis, & Wigboldus 2008 PS 1 • •
Smith, Dijksterhuis, & Wigboldus 2008 PS 2 • •
Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk 2008 PS 1 • •
Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk 2008 PS 2 • • •
Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk 2008 PS 3 • • •
Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk 2008 PS 4 • • •
Smith & Trope 2006 JPSP 1 • • •
Smith & Trope 2006 JPSP 2 • • •
Smith & Trope 2006 JPSP 3 • •
Smith & Trope 2006 JPSP 4 • • •
Smith & Trope 2006 JPSP 5 • • •
Smith & Trope 2006 JPSP 6 • • •
Smith & Trope 2006 JPSP 7 • • •
Stillman, Baumeister, & DeWall 2007 PSPB 1 • •
Stillman, Baumeister, & DeWall 2007 PSPB 2 • • •
Strelan, Weick, & Vasiljevic 2014 BJSP 1 • •
Strelan, Weick, & Vasiljevic 2014 BJSP 2 • •
Strelan, Weick, & Vasiljevic 2014 BJSP 3 • •
Strelan, Weick, & Vasiljevic 2014 BJSP 4 • •
Tiedens & Fragale 2003 JPSP 1 • • •
Tiedens & Fragale 2003 JPSP 2 • •
Tost, Gino, & Larrick 2013 AMJ 1 • •
Tost, Gino, & Larrick 2013 AMJ 2 • •
Tost, Gino, & Larrick 2013 AMJ 3 • •
Tost, Gino, & Larrick 2012 OBHDP 1 • • •
Tost, Gino, & Larrick 2012 OBHDP 2 • •
Tost, Gino, & Larrick 2012 OBHDP 3 • • •
Tjosvold 1985 OBHDP 1 • •
van Dijk & De Cremer 2006 PSPB 1 • •
van Dijk & De Cremer 2006 PSPB 2 • •
Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead 2006 EJSP 4 • •
Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead 2006 EJSP 5 • •
Van Kleef, Oveis, Homan, van der Löwe, & Keltner 2015 SPPS 4 • •
van Prooijen, Coffeng, & Vermeer 2014 JESP 1 • •
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van Prooijen, Coffeng, & Vermeer 2014 JESP 4 • •
Wade-Benzoni, Hernandez, Medvec, & Messick 2008 JESP 3 • •
Weick & Guinote 2010 JESP 1 • •
Weick & Guinote 2010 JESP 2 • •
Weick & Guinote 2010 JESP 3 • •
Weick & Guinote 2008 JPSP 1a • •
Weick & Guinote 2008 JPSP 1b • •
Weick & Guinote 2008 JPSP 3 • •
Whitson, Liljenquist, Galinsky et al. 2013 JESP 1 • •
Whitson, Liljenquist, Galinsky et al. 2013 JESP 2 • •
Willis, Guinote, & Rodriguez-Bailon 2010 JESP 2 • •
Wiltermuth & Flynn 2013 AMJ 1 • •
Wiltermuth & Flynn 2013 AMJ 4 • •
Waytz, Chou, Magee, & Galinsky 2015 OBHDP 2a • •
Waytz, Chou, Magee, & Galinsky 2015 OBHDP 2b • •
Waytz, Chou, Magee, & Galinsky 2015 OBHDP 2c • •
Waytz, Chou, Magee, & Galinsky 2015 OBHDP 3 • • •
Waytz, Chou, Magee, & Galinsky 2015 OBHDP 4 • • •
Waytz, Chou, Magee, & Galinsky 2015 OBHDP 5 • •
Yap, Mason, & Ames 2013 JESP 1 • •
Yap, Mason, & Ames 2013 JESP 2 • •
Yap, Wazlawek, Lucas, Cuddy, & Carney 2013 PS 1 • •
Yap, Wazlawek, Lucas, Cuddy, & Carney 2013 PS 2 • •
Yap, Wazlawek, Lucas, Cuddy, & Carney 2013 PS 3 • •
Appendix C. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2018.08.004.
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